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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
DEBBRA JO CLARK, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20140955-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) (2012). See 
Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: The defense witness admitted during cross-examination that she had been 
convicted of a crime and that Clark's boyfriend was listed on the Information as her co-
defendant. Despite this, the court admitted the witness's Information and Arrest Warrant 
as impeachment evidence for the purpose of showing that Clark's boyfriend was listed on 
the Information as a co-defendant. The question on appeal is whether the court abused its 
discretion by admitting the Information and Arrest Warrant. 
Standard of Review and Preservation: A trial court's decision admitting evidence 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,,r8, 67 P.3d 
1005. This issue is preserved by objection. R.174:150; see infra Part LG.I; Addendum B. 
Alternatively, this issue may be addressed for plain error. See infra Part I.G.2. 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following are in Addendum C: U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah 
R.Evid.401,402,403,611,801, 802,803,804,807,901,902. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE 
a. Procedural History. 
Following Clark's arrest at a Smith's grocery store on November 30, 2013, she 
was charged by Information with one count of Retail Theft, third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code §76-6-602 (2012) and §76-6-412(l)(b)(ii) (2014), 1 and one count 
of Criminal Trespass, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §76-6-206(2)(b) 
(2012). R.1-2. Following a preliminary hearing, Clark was bound over as charged. R.41-
42; 67-83. Before trial, Clark filed a motion to bifurcate, requesting a bench trial on the 
Retail Theft enhancement and on the Criminal Trespass count. R.100-03. Following a 
hearing, the trial court granted Clark's motion. R.109-1 0; 174:4-5; 193:31-33. 
A jury trial was held on August 27, 2014. R.146-49; 174. Before the jury, each 
party called one witness to testify: The State called Bobbie Davis, a loss prevention 
officer for Smith's, and the defense called Debbie Larsen. R.174. The State originally 
objected to Larsen's testimony because Clark did not provide a witness list. R.85-87; 
1 The State conceded below that the 2014 version of section 76-6-412 applies in this case. 
R.174:194-202. 
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174:6-8, 52-54. After talking to Larsen, however, the prosecutor withdrew the objection . 
R.174: 122-23. 
On cross-examination, the State questioned Larsen about her conviction for Theft 
by Deception. R.174:141-47. Larsen admitted the conviction and admitted that Clark's 
boyfriend, Christian Hale, was listed as her co-defendant on the Information. R.174:145-
49. Larsen explained, however, that she believed there was a mix-up on the Information 
and that Hale was not actually her co-defendant because his name did not appear on her 
court paperwork and he was not present at her court hearings. R.174:145-49. Over 
objection, the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 2 as impeachment evidence for the 
purpose of showing that Hale was listed on the Information as Larsen's co-defendant. 
R.174:149-50. State's Exhibit 2 was a complete copy of the Information and Arrest 
Warrant related to Larsen's Theft by Deception conviction. 2 R.174: 149-50. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on Retail Theft. R.144; 174: 196. Outside the 
presence of the jury, the trial court heard evidence and argument on the Retail Theft 
enhancement. R.174:200-02. The court then found Clark guilty of Retail Theft, a third 
degree felony, and of Criminal Trespass. R.17 4: 193, 200-02. Thereafter, the court 
sentenced Clark to serve a prison term of zero-to-five years for Retail Theft and a jail 
term of 180 days for Criminal Trespass. R.162-64; 194:12-13. The court suspended the 
sentences, placed Clark on probation for 36 months, and ordered Clark to serve 365 days 
in jail. R.162-64; 194:12-16. Clark filed a timely notice of appeal. R.168. 
2 A redacted copy of State's Exhibit 2 is located at Addendum D. The original State's 
Exhibit 2 is not redacted and is located at R.175. 
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b. The State's Evidence. 
Davis, the loss prevention officer, described the alleged offense as follows. On 
November 30, 2013, Clark and Larsen arrived at Smith's grocery store together but 
entered the store separately. R.17 4: 109. Clark entered first. R.17 4: 109. Davis had met 
Clark before. R.174:75-76. During the prior meeting, Davis had "trespassed" Clark and 
"asked her to never come back into any Smith's again." R.174:76. 
When Davis saw Clark, she called the police and "maintained visual on" Clark. 
R.174:75-76. According to Davis, this meant that she followed Clark and "maintained 
visual" on Clark even if she "had to get down on [her] knees" to do it. R.174:76, 101. 
Though Davis denied concealing herself, she admitted that she positioned herself in a 
way that Clark could not see her and watched Clark though wire racks. R.174:98-99, 101. 
Clark, who was carrying a large purse, walked down the home improvement aisle 
to the Command hooks area. R.174:77-79, 91, 95-98. Davis watched Clark from the front 
of the aisle, 60 to 70 feet away, and saw Clark select two to three items from the shelf. 
R.174:77. Clark then walked along the aisle at the back of the store to the seasonal 
department. R.174:78, 99-100. Davis followed Clark by walking along the aisle at the 
front of the store. R.174:78. 
The seasonal department contained "big displays." R.174:78-79. According to 
Davis, it is an area "free from view of other customers or employees." R.174:78-79. In 
Davis's opinion, Clark did not appear to be shopping in the seasonal department. 
R.174:79. "Her eyes were darting" around, and she went behind a "blow-up snowman," 
where there was no "small merchandise" to look at. R. 174:79, 113. Davis concluded that 
4 
Clark went behind the snowman so "she couldn't be seen." R.174:79. While in the 
seasonal department, Clark put the items she had taken from the shelf into her purse. 
R.174:78-79, 114-15. Davis could not see Clark's whole body at that time, but she could 
see Clark's hands and mid-torso. R.174:79, 102. 
Clark then walked back along the aisle at the back of the store and turned up an 
aisle that led to the front of the store and the exit. R.174:80-81, 86, 103-04. Davis again 
followed Clark by walking along the aisle at the front of the store. R.174:80-81. 
At trial, Davis described Clark's movements as deliberate, saying that Clark 
walked "straight down" the home improvement aisle to the Command hooks area, 
"quickly walked" to and from the seasonal department, and headed "straight for the exit" 
without "looking for anything else." R.174:77-81, 91, 95-100, 103-04. At the preliminary 
hearing, however, Davis testified that Clark "wandered" to the Command hooks area, 
"wandered" to the seasonal department, and "wandered down an aisle" toward the exit. 
R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04. When confronted about her inconsistent testimony, Davis said 
that she "misspoke" at the preliminary hearing. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04, 111-13. 
Davis testified that Clark saw her as Clark neared the floral department at the front 
of the store, which was "mere feet from the exit." R.174:87, 105, 116. Clark "made full-
on eye contact with" Davis. R.174:88. According to Davis, Clark registered "shock" and 
"panic." R.174:88. Clark then "quickly spun around and went" back into the aisles. 
R.174:88, 118. Davis again followed Clark and, from fifteen feet away, observed Clark 
remove items from her purse and "ditch[]" them on a shelf. R.174:88-89, 117. According 
to Davis, Clark also watched "to see if [Davis] was still following her." R.174:89. 
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Clark then went down one aisle and up the next toward the exit. R.174:90. Davis 
and two assistants stopped Clark before she exited and told Clark that the police were 
coming. R.174:90. Clark asked Davis why she was stopping her, and Davis "informed 
her of the criminal trespass." R. 174:91. Clark said, "I didn't steal anything" and opened 
her purse. R.174:91. The purse was "completely empty." R.174:91. 
Davis took Clark to the loss prevention office. R.174:90. After the police arrived, 
Davis said to Clark, '" What are you doing in my store? You had been trespassed."' 
R.174:91. Clark responded that she "knew that she was trespassed" and said that "she 
didn't know why she was there." R.174:91. Davis asked Clark if she had come to the 
store with anyone else, and Clark responded that she had come with Larsen. R.174:92. 
After receiving a call from the service desk and reviewing security footage, Davis 
determined that Larsen was at the service desk attempting to return Command hooks 
without a receipt. R.174:92-93, 107. Davis stopped Larsen at the service desk. R.174:92-
93. According to Davis, Larsen "willingly handed" the hooks to Davis, saying that "she 
did not want them" and that she did not want to complete the return. R.17 4: 108, 11 7. 
Larsen was permitted to leave the store. R.174: 108. Davis then retrieved the items that 
Clark had "ditched" on a shelf, and the police arrested Clark. R.174:93-94. 
Davis claimed that the items she retrieved from the shelf were hooks like those 
that Larsen had been trying to return without a receipt. R.174:93-94, 107. The State did 
not produce the items from the shelf or the hooks that Larsen attempted to return. 
R.174:107-08, 117. Davis testified that all of the items, including the hooks that Larsen 
attempted to return, had been "put back into stock" and sold. R.174: I 07-08. 
6 
c·. 
'f/iiJ 
~-
c. The Defense Evidence. 
Larsen testified as follows. Larsen and Clark are friends. R.174:126. They went to 
Smith's together on November 30 because Larsen had items to return and Clark was 
shopping for "stuff for dinner." R.174: 127. They had decided to have dinner together, 
and Clark was going to cook. R.174:136. 
Larsen planned to return three medications, for which she had receipts, and "two 
hooks," for which she did not. R.174: 127. Her boyfriend had purchased the hooks for her, 
and "he never keeps his receipts." R.174: 128, 133, 135. She returned the hooks because 
they were too wide for the wall where she planned to use them. R.174: 128, 130, 135. 
Clark entered the store first because Larsen had to settle her dog in the car before 
going in. R.174:128, 137. When Larsen entered the store, she went to the service desk. 
R.174: 128-29. There, after waiting her tum, she approached the desk to return the items 
and explained that she did not have receipts for the hooks because her boyfriend does not 
keep receipts. R.174: 129, 133-34. The clerk said that was fine and that Larsen would 
receive a gift card for the return. R.174: 133-34. 
When the transaction was nearly complete, Davis approached Larsen and asked if 
she was with Clark. R.174: 128-29. Larsen responded that she was, and Davis accused her 
of having Clark hand off stolen items to her. R.17 4: 128-31. Davis then took Larsen's 
photograph and told Larsen "not to come in their store ever again." R.174: 129-31. 
Larsen testified that she "begged" Davis to review the security footage because it 
would show that she had not even passed Clark in the store. R.174: 131-32. Davis "started 
just screaming at me and wouldn't listen to me." R.174:131-32. Larsen was not charged 
7 
with a crime. R.174: 132. She left the store with the medication and the hooks and 
returned the items at a different Smith's store. R.174: 131-32. 
d. The State's Cross-Examination of Larsen and Rebuttal Evidence. 
During cross-examination, the State asked Larsen when she had last seen Clark's 
boyfriend, Christian Hale. R.174: 139-41. Larsen responded that she had seen Hale about 
a month before November 30. R.174:141. The State asked if that was the time Larsen and 
Hale "were passing forged checks." R.174:141. Defense counsel objected. R.174:141. 
After hearing argument, the trial court permitted the State to admit evidence that Larsen 
had been convicted of Theft by Deception, a class A misdemeanor. R.174:141-44. 
Although the State misstated the conviction as forgery, a third-degree felony, 
Larsen readily admitted the conviction. R.174: 145. Defense counsel objected because the 
State had misstated the conviction, and the court corrected the record: "Members of the 
jury, you are instructed that Ms. Larsen was not convicted of a third-degree felony 
forgery. She was convicted of a class A misdemeanor theft by deception." R.174:146. 
Defense counsel also corrected the record. R.17 4: 151. Counsel stipulated to the 
conviction, and the Judgment was not admitted into evidence. R.174: 155-56. 
In questioning Larsen about the conviction, the State asked Larsen if she was 
charged with Hale. R.174:145. Larsen responded, "[W]e weren't charged together. We 
never went [to court] together." R.174: 145. When the State showed Larsen the 
Information, which contained both her name and Hale's name, Larsen admitted that 
Hale's name was on the Information but explained, "There was some mix-up in my court 
8 
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case, because they said that for some reason he is tacked on the end of mine, when we 
never had trial together, never had court together or nothing at all." R.174: 145-46. 
Larsen testified that she and Hale both received forged checks from the same 
person, J.D. Cook, and that they both cashed the forged checks, but that they did not do it 
together. R.174:146-49. She explained that Cook made a check out in her name and that 
she took it to Wells Fargo and cashed it. R.17 4: 146-4 7. She did not know it was forged at 
the time, but she learned it was forged after she cashed it. R.174:147-49. She pleaded 
guilty because she wanted to avoid a felony conviction and because she kept the money 
even after she learned that the check was forged. R.174: 149, 153-56. 
Larsen testified that she did not "know why" she and Hale were listed on the same 
Information. R.174:146. She stated that "Hale was not in my court papers." R.174:149. 
She and Hale received forged checks from the same person, but they did not cash the 
checks together or go to court together. R.174:149-50. Larsen did not even know when 
Hale cashed his check. R.174: 148. Larsen said that her probation officer told her that 
Hale's name being on same Information as hers was "a mix-up." R.174:150. 
The State moved to admit State's Exhibit 2, which contained the complete 
Information and Arrest Warrant from Larsen's Theft by Deception case, arguing that it 
impeached Larsen because the Information listed Hale as a co-defendant and Larsen 
"stated that Christian Hale was never on her court documents." R.174:149-50. 
Defense counsel objected that State's Exhibit 2 could not be used to impeach since 
it contained allegations, not convictions: "[A]n Information is allegations not a 
conviction. And ... I'm not sure how ... allegations [are] impeachment material." 
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R.174:150. Counsel also objected because the line of questioning was not relevant and, 
even if it was, State's Exhibit 2 contained additional evidence that was not relevant: "[I]t 
is not just going to whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged together, which, by the way, 
I don't think is relevant here." R.174:150. Additionally, counsel objected because State's 
Exhibit 2 did not actually impeach Larsen: Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't know 
how court dockets work, how people are charged." R.174:150. The trial court overruled 
defense counsel's objections and admitted State's Exhibit 2. R.174:150. 
The State also called Davis back to the stand to provide rebuttal testimony. Davis 
testified that when she asked Larsen whether Larsen knew Clark, Larsen acted confused 
and said that she came to the store alone. R.174:158-59. Davis then confronted Larsen, 
saying, "' Are you sure you didn't arrive here with somebody? Because I just watched on 
video you arriving in a vehicle with a woman that I have upstairs .... And she admitted 
that she came here with you."' R.174: 158. Larsen responded, "'Oh, well, she asked me to 
do this return."' R.174: 158. Davis said, '"Okay, well, we are going to keep this 
merchandise, and you are free to leave."' R.174:158. Larsen responded, "'Okay, I don't 
want nothing to do with this,"' and left. R.174:158. Davis recalled that she spoke to 
Larsen calmly but that Larsen was agitated. R.17 4: 159-60. Davis could not recall whether 
Larsen had merchandise with her other than the hooks, but Davis recalled that Larsen did 
not take the hooks with her when she left the store. R.174:160-61. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by admitting State's Exhibit 2 because the 
exhibit was irrelevant, its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the 
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danger of unfair prejudice, it was not authenticated, it was inadmissible hearsay, and it 
violated Clark's right to confrontation. 
First, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant. Rule 402 excludes irrelevant evidence. 
Contradiction evidence is irrelevant if it does not contradict the witness's testimony or if 
it is offered in response to a collateral matter brought up during cross-examination. Here, 
State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant because it did not contradict Larsen's testimony and it 
was offered to impeach a collateral matter raised during cross-examination. 
Second, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 403 because its probative 
value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial if it tends to encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning. 
Here, State's Exhibit 2 had no probative value or, if it did, the value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger that it would unfairly undermine Larsen's credibility and 
encourage the jury to convict based on improper reasoning such as guilt by association. 
Third, State's Exhibit 2 was not authenticated. To be received in evidence, a 
document must be authenticated. Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible because it did 
not meet the authentication requirements of rules 901 and 902. 
Fourth, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under the hearsay rules. To be 
admissible, testimony must not be hearsay or must qualify for an exception to the hearsay 
rule. Here, State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay and did not qualify under the business records 
exception, the public records exception, or any other exception to the hearsay rule. 
Finally, State's Exhibit 2 violated the Confrontation Clause. Testimonial hearsay 
is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity to 
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cross-examine. State's Exhibit 2 was testimonial because it was made with an eye toward 
prosecution, and it was inadmissible because the State made no showing that the 
declarants were unavailable or that there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
This Court should reverse because State's Exhibit 2 prejudiced Clark. There was 
no physical evidence to support the State's case for Retail Theft. The question for the jury 
was whether to believe Davis's claim that Clark engaged in retail theft or Larsen's claim 
that Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to the wrong conclusion. There is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have believed Larsen had State's Exhibit 2 not 
been admitted. First, Larsen offered a compelling reason to believe her testimony despite 
her friendship with Clark and her conviction for Theft by Deception. Second, there was 
evidence to support a finding that Davis's testimony was unreliable because she pre-
judged Clark and her memory had been colored by her desire to see Clark convicted. 
Third, the record suggests that the jury found Larsen's testimony persuasive despite the 
improper impeachment. Finally, the court did not give a limiting instruction, meaning the 
jury was free to consider State's Exhibit 2 for improper purposes. 
This issue is preserved or can be reviewed for plain error. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 2 INTO EVIDENCE 
The admissibility of evidence at trial is governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
See Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), l IOI(a). '"Character evidence is evidence of a person's general 
propensity, such as the propensity to be honest or truthful. It refers to broad, cross-
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situational traits-propensities that supposedly influence a wide range of conduct."' 
State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,if28, 318 P.3d 1221 (emphasis in original). 
Character evidence is governed by the character evidence rules, such as rules 404, 607, 
608, and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,r27. But if 
impeachment evidence is not "offered to establish [a witness's] character or character 
trait," it is not character evidence. Id. ,r,r27-29. "[E]xtrinsic evidence offered for other 
grounds of impeachment (such as contradiction, prior inconsistent statement, bias and 
mental capacity)" is not governed by the character evidence rules. Id. if29. The same is 
true of "evidence used to directly rebut a witness's testimony or other evidence." Id. The 
admissibility of such evidence is governed by "Rules 402 and 403." Id.; see State v. 
Kamrowski, 2015 UT App 75,,r8, ---P.3d---. Such evidence is also subject to the 
authentication rules, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), 1 lOl(a). 
State's Exhibit 2 was the complete Information and Arrest Warrant filed against 
Larsen in a separate criminal action pertaining to an unrelated matter. R.17 4: 150. The 
trial court did not admit State's Exhibit 2 to impeach Larsen's character. R.174: 145-50. 
Rather, the court admitted the exhibit to impeach Larsen by contradicting her cross-
examination testimony. R.174: 145-50. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was not character evidence 
governed by the character evidence rules. See Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,r27. Rather, it 
was contradiction evidence governed by "Rules 402 and 403." Id. ,r29. It was also 
governed by the authentication rules, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. See 
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah R.Evid. lOl(a), 1 IOI(a). 
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This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
State's Exhibit 2 into evidence. First, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 402 
because it was irrelevant. See infra Part I.A. Second, it was inadmissible under rule 403 
because its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. See infra Part J.B. Third, it was 
inadmissible under rules 901 and 902 because it was not authenticated. See infra Part LC. 
Fourth, it was inadmissible under the hearsay rules because it was hearsay and did not 
qualify for any exception to the hearsay rule. See infra Part I.D. Finally, it was 
inadmissible because it violated Clark's right to confrontation. See infra Part I.E. This 
Court should reverse because the exhibit prejudiced Clark. See infra Part I.F. Finally, this 
issue is preserved or should be reviewed for plain error. See infra Part I.G. 
A. State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible under Rule 402 Because It Was 
Irrelevant 
Rule 402 states that "[r]elevant evidence is admissible" and "[i]rrelevant evidence 
is not admissible." Utah R.Evid. 402. Rule 401 says that "[ e ]vidence is relevant if ( a) it 
has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable that it would be without the 
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Utah R.Evid. 401. 
"Where evidence 'has no probative value to a fact at issue, it is irrelevant and is 
inadmissible under rule 402."' State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,ifl5, 67 P.3d 1005. 
On cross-examination, a party may inquire into "matters affecting the witness's 
credibility." Utah R.Evid. 61 l(b). "[O]nce [a witness] offers evidence or makes an 
assertion as to any fact, the State may cross-examine or introduce on rebuttal any 
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testimony or evidence 'which would tend to contradict, explain or cast doubt upon the 
credibility of [the witness's] testimony."' Thompson, 2014 UT App 14,,I30; see State v. 
Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1977) (same). 
But "[c]ross-examination should not go beyond ... matters affecting the witness's 
credibility." Utah R.Evid. 611 (b). "Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item 
of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter 
properly provable in the case." Fed. R.Evid. 401, Adv. Committee Note. The rule 
permitting a party to cross-examine or introduce on rebuttal any evidence which tends to 
cast doubt on the credibility of the witness's testimony "cannot be employed as a pretext 
for the admission of evidence that is in itself incompetent and prejudicial." Bingham 
Mines Co. v. Bianco, 246 F. 936, 937 (8th Cir. 1917). 
In this case, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant "to any elements of the crime 
[allegedly] committed by [Clark]." State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 291 (Utah Ct.App. 
1998), ajf'd on other grounds, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243. Its only potential relevance 
"was to cast doubt on the credibility of [Larsen], the ground upon which [the State] 
sought to have it admitted." State v. Stewart, 925 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
"For this kind of evidence to be admissible, the party offering the evidence must 
lay a sufficient foundation to show the evidence is relevant." Id. Further, when the 
evidence is offered to contradict a statement made by the witness during cross-
examination, the party must also show that the evidence relates to a matter that is 
'"material and relevant."' Davenport v. State, 519 P.2d 452,454 (Alaska 1974). 
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Here, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant because the State (a) failed to lay a 
sufficient foundation of relevancy, and (b) failed to show that the evidence related to a 
matter that was material and relevant at trial. 
]. State's Exhibit 2 Was Inadmissible Because the State Failed to Establish 
a Foundation of Relevancy. 
The State offered State's Exhibit 2 "to cast doubt on" Larsen's credibility. Stewart, 
925 P.2d at 600. "For this kind of evidence to be admissible, the party offering the 
evidence must lay a sufficient foundation to show the evidence is relevant." Id. To lay a 
sufficient foundation of relevancy, the party must show that the evidence actually casts 
doubt on the witness's credibility. See id.; Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 291. 
In Finlayson, for instance, this Court held that expert testimony "was irrelevant 
and therefore inadmissible" because "defendant did not lay a proper foundation" of 
relevancy. Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 292. There, defendant was charged with raping a 
Japanese student. Id. at 286. Defendant proposed to present expert testimony that 
"Japanese cultural values" require a Japanese woman to '"save face"' by manufacturing a 
rape after premarital sexual intercourse. Id. at 291. The trial court excluded the evidence, 
and this Court affirmed. This Court held that the evidence was irrelevant because 
defendant failed to establish a proper foundation of relevancy by "show[ing] that the 
victim was aware of such Japanese cultural values" and "was likely to act in conformity 
with these values." Id. at 291; see Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600-03 (defendant failed to lay 
foundation of relevancy for evidence of witness's mental illness where defendant failed 
to show that the illness (1) "affect[ed] the witness's ability to accurately perceive, recall, 
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and relate events" and (2) "existed either at the time of the event regarding which the 
witness ha[ d] been called to testify, or at the time testimony [ wa]s given"). 
Here, the State failed to establish a foundation of relevancy for State's Exhibit 2 
because the exhibit did not cast doubt on Larsen's credibility. Larsen admitted that she 
was convicted of Theft by Deception for her role in the check-cashing scheme. 
R.174:141-45. She also admitted that Hale cashed a similar check, was charged for his 
involvement in the same check-cashing scheme, and was listed on the same Information. 
R.174:145-50. The testimony that the State proposed to impeach was Larsen's statement 
that she believed there was "some mix-up" in listing her and Hale as co-defendants on the 
same Information. R.174:145-46. Larsen explained that she believed there was a mix up 
because she and Hale "weren't charged together," they "never went [to court] together," 
Hale's name "was not in [her] court papers," and her probation officer told her that it was 
"a mix-up." R.174: 145, 149-50. 
But Larsen's testimony that she believed there was a "mix-up" in listing her and 
Hale on the same Information was not a lie to be impeached. R.174:145-50. Rather, it 
was simply her understanding of how her case proceeded through the criminal justice 
system. R.174: 145-50. It is evident that Larsen did not have legal training and that her 
understanding of the criminal justice system was imperfect. For example, though the 
State misstated Larsen's conviction as forgery, a third-degree felony, Larsen still 
admitted the conviction. R.174:145. In short, as stated by defense counsel, Larsen's 
statement was not a lie to be impeached because Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't 
know how court dockets work, how people are charged." R.174:150. 
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Besides, even if Larsen's testimony regarding a possible "mix-up" on the 
Information was the type of testimony that could be impeached, State's Exhibit 2 did not 
impeach it. State's Exhibit 2 did not undermine the accuracy of Larsen's testimony that 
Hale's name was on the Information but was not on her other court papers. See R.175. 
Nor did it undermine the accuracy of Larsen's testimony that Hale was not present at her 
initial appearance, where the charges were read, or at any of her other court hearings. See 
id. On the contrary, it corroborated Larsen's testimony that she was convicted due to her 
involvement in the check-cashing scheme, that Hale was involved in the same scheme, 
and that her name and Hale's were on the same Information. See id. 
In fact, though unnecessary to the decision, this Court may take judicial notice 
from the court dockets in Larsen's and Hale's criminal cases that Larsen's understanding 
of the court proceedings in her case was reasonable, if not accurate. See Utah R.Evid. 
201(b)(2) ("The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute 
because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned."); State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360, 1361-62 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1993) (taking judicial notice of a transcript from a different case where the 
parties did not dispute the contents of the transcript); Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 
(Utah 1977) ("notice may be taken of the record of another case"). 
The court dockets show that Larsen's and Hale's cases proceeded separately under 
different case numbers. See Addenda E, F. Hale's case was resolved in ECR (Early Case 
Resolution)-He made his initial appearance on June 4, 2013, and pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced two days later. See Addendum F. By contrast, Larsen's case began in ECR but 
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was transferred to district court, where it received a new case number-Larsen made her 
initial appearance on June 19, 2013, pleaded guilty on December 5, 2013, and was 
sentenced on February 11, 2014. See Addendum E. In short, the court dockets confirm 
Larsen's testimony that Hale was listed on the Information with her, but Hale was not on 
her other court papers, present at her initial appearance, where the charges were read, or 
present at any of her other court hearings. See Addenda E, F. 
Given the court dockets, it is doubtful whether a document exists that could have 
cast doubt on the credibility of Larsen's testimony that she believed there was a "mix-up" 
on the Information. See Addenda E, F. Regardless, if there was such a document, it was 
not State's Exhibit 2. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 corroborated rather than 
impeached Larsen's testimony. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant for impeachment 
because the State failed to show that the exhibit actually cast doubt on Larsen's 
credibility. See Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 291; Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600. 
2. State's Exhibit 2 Was Irrelevant Because the State Failed to Show that 
the Evidence Related to a Matter that Was Material and Relevant at Trial 
When evidence is offered to contradict a statement made by a witness during 
cross-examination, the offering party must show that the evidence relates to a matter that 
is '"material and relevant."' Davenport, 519 P .2d at 454. "[T]he answers of a witness 
upon cross-examination on any irrelevant or collateral matter are conclusive and binding, 
and the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon an immaterial or collateral 
matter of issue." State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Utah 1977). In other words, "a 
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party is barred from impeaching a witness on a collateral matter through the use of 
extrinsic evidence." United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2008). 
'" It is generally stated that facts which would be independently provable are not 
collateral."' Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Stated another way, "[t]he determination of 
whether an issue is collateral or not turns on whether it is 'relevant for a purpose other 
than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness."' Lipscomb, 539 F.3d at 
39. "Specifically, the 'offered testimony must not only contradict a statement of [the 
witness], but must also be material to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence.'" Id. 
For instance, "facts which are relevant to the issue of the case" are not collateral. 
Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Nor are "facts independently provable to impeach or 
disqualify the witness," such as evidence "to show bias, interest, conviction of a crime or 
lack of capacity or opportunity for knowledge of the facts related." Id. A "third type of 
allowable contradiction" evidence is "the contradiction of any part of the witness's 
account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter 
of human experience he would not have been mistaken about if his story were true." Id. 
This "third kind of fact" does not permit a party "to prove [ a witness] wrong in some 
trivial detail of time, place, or circumstance." Id. But if the "witness has told a story of a 
transaction crucial to the controversy" and the opposing party proposes evidence "to 
prove untrue some facts recited by the witness that if he were really there and saw what 
he claims to have seen, he could not have been mistaken about," such evidence may be 
admitted. Id. 
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Thus, in Lipscomb, the district court correctly prevented the defendant from 
introducing contradiction evidence. At trial in that case, "two detectives testified that they 
observed [defendant] driving a green Jaguar with the license plate 'XM-82."' Lipscomb, 
539 F.3d at 39. Defendant proposed to impeach the detectives with evidence that his 
"green Jaguar was registered under a vanity license plate, 'SOVRN."' Id. The district 
court denied defendant's request because the proposed line of impeachment was "a 
collateral issue on which extrinsic evidence is inadmissible." Id. The appellate court 
affirmed because defendant "failed to establish any independent and material ground for 
admitting the ... evidence." Id. Rather, the evidence "was only relevant to impeaching the 
detectives' credibility on a topic immaterial to [defendant]'s guilt." Id. Thus, "[t]he 
district court did not abuse its discretion" by excluding the evidence. Id. 
For similar reasons, the district court abused its discretion by admitting the 
Government's proposed contradiction evidence in United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 
721 (10th Cir. 1977). During cross-examination in that case, the Government asked one 
of the defendants whether he had "ever possessed any automatic weapons." Id. at 725. 
When the defendant said he had not, the district court permitted the Government to 
introduce a rifle found in the trunk of the defendant's car "purportedly to impeach the 
testimony of [the] defendant[] after he had denied possessing any automatic weapon." Id. 
at 724. The appellate court reversed, holding that "[i]t is not possible to justify the receipt 
in evidence of this rifle on the basis of its being relevant." Id. at 725. The rifle was not 
independently relevant because it "was never a part of this charge." Id. Further, the rifle 
was not relevant for impeachment because "it is not permissible to impeach a witness on 
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a collateral or irrelevant matter elicited on cross-examination." Id. at 726. Thus, the 
appellate court remanded each defendant's case for a new trial. Id. at 730. 
Whereas, in Mitchell, our supreme court held that defendant's contradiction 
evidence should have been admitted because it "was not impeachment ... on a collateral 
issue." Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. In that case, complainant took the stand and denied 
that "she had ever sold heroin." Id. The trial court denied defendant's request to impeach 
complainant's testimony with evidence that an undercover agent had twice bought heroin 
from her. Id. On appeal, our supreme court reversed. Id. "There were two versions as to 
what occurred at the [complainants'] residence." Id. The State claimed that "[n]arcotics 
were not present or involved" in the incident. Id. Rather, "two armed robbers charged 
into the home, terrorized the occupants, and took cash from [the complainants]." Id. On 
the other hand, the defendant claimed that "no weapons were involved" and "no cash was 
taken." Id. Rather, he was a "dissatisfied customer" who argued with complainant "over 
the quality of the [narcotics] purchased" from her and stole a bag of narcotics. Id. Thus, 
defendant's proposed impeachment evidence "was not a collateral issue" because 
"[w]hether [complainant] in fact, distributed narcotics from her residence was, indeed, a 
relevant issue in the case, which defendant was entitled to prove for a purpose 
independent of impeaching [complainant's] testimony." Id. 
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant because it was extrinsic evidence offered 
to impeach Larsen on a collateral matter. See Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. The question of 
whether Larsen and Hale were co-defendants in the check-cashing case "was not 
independently relevant" to Clark's guilt or innocence. Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725; see 
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Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Nor did Clark "voluntarily create any such issue" at trial. 
Warledo, 557 F.2d at 726. "Rather, the [prosecutor] injected the issue himself by asking" 
Larsen during cross-examination whether Hale was her co-defendant. Id. When Larsen 
acknowledged that Hale was listed on the Information as her co-defendant but stated that 
she believed listing Hale as her co-defendant was a "mix-up," the State offered State's 
Exhibit 2 for impeachment. R.174: 149-50. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 did not 
impeach Larsen's testimony. See supra Part I.A.I. But, even if it did, it was not relevant 
because "it is not permissible to impeach a witness on a collateral or irrelevant matter 
elicited on cross-examination." Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725. 
In sum, as in Warledo and Lipscomb, State's Exhibit 2 was not relevant because it 
was extrinsic evidence offered to "impeach[] a witness on a collateral matter." Lipscomb, 
539 F.3d at 39. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 402. 
B. State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible under Rule 403 Because Its 
Probative Value, If Any, Was Substantially Outweighed by the Danger 
of Unfair Prejudice. 
Even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some relevance for impeachment, it was 
inadmissible under rule 403 because its probative value, if any, was substantially 
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 
Rule 403 says that a "court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] 
misleading the jury." Utah R.Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if "'it tends to 
encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning."' State v. Jones, 2015 UT 
19,if30, 345 P.3d 1195; see State v. Toki, 2011 UT App 293,,I44, 263 P.3d 481. 
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Rule 403 creates a "balancing framework." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60,iJ31, 296 
P.3d 673. When applying rule 403, a court will balance the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of "'scant or cumulative 
probative force"' are not "'dragged in by the heels for the sake of [their] prejudicial 
effect."' State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct.App. 1989); cf. Verde, 2012 UT 
60,iJl 8. "In short," a trial court applying "rule 403 seeks to balance two competing 
concerns: 'excluding the ... evidence if its tendency to sustain a proper inference is 
outweighed by its propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion about its 
real purpose."' State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215,iJ45, 335 P.3d 900. 
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible under rule 403. As explained above, 
Clark's position is that State's Exhibit 2 had no probative value. See stpra Part I.A. Its 
only potential relevance and the purpose for which it was offered was to cast doubt on 
Larsen's credibility. See id.; R.174:149-50. But it was not relevant for that purpose 
because it did not impeach Larsen's testimony and, even if it did, it was impeachment on 
an irrelevant and collateral matter. See stpra Part I.A. 
Even if State's Exhibit 2 has some scant probative value for impeachment, it was 
inadmissible under rule 403 because the probative value, if any, was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the 
jury. To the extent that any part of State's Exhibit 2 was relevant to impeach Larsen's 
testimony, it was the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as 
co-defendants. See R.175. The remainder was irrelevant to impeachment. See supra Part 
I.A. In fact, it corroborated rather than impeached Larsen's testimony. See id. 
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On the other hand, State's Exhibit 2 was highly prejudicial. The evidence showed 
that Larsen was Clark's close friend and that Hale was Clark's boyfriend. R.174: 126, 
139. State's Exhibit 2 unfairly prejudiced Clark because it unfairly undermined Larsen's 
credibility and created a danger that the jury would convict Clark based on a finding of 
guilt by association. 
State's Exhibit 2 was an official court document that painted Clark's good friend 
Larsen and boyfriend Hale as dishonest thieves and repeat criminals, who had stolen not 
just inexpensive retail items but large amounts of cash. The Information provided 
Larsen's full name, birth date, address, driver's license number, and social security 
number. See R.175. It listed four aliases for her. See id. It charged her with forgery, a 
third degree felony, and listed the elements of forgery, including that she acted "with the 
purpose to defraud." Id. It informed the jury that the check Larsen cashed was for nearly 
$1,000 and gave a detailed account of the check-cashing scheme, the investigation, and 
Larsen's admissions. See id. Further, the Arrest Warrant informed the jury that the 
magistrate had found probable cause to support Larsen's arrest and "reasonable grounds 
to believe" that Larsen could not be trusted to "appear upon a summons" and, therefore, 
should be arrested "forthwith" at any time "day or night," pursued "into any other 
county" if she had "fled justice," and required to post $5,000 bail. Id. Additionally, the 
Information told the jury that the check Hale cashed was for nearly $1,000, that Hale 
would be held under $5,000 bail, and that Hale was subject to enhanced penalties because 
he had "been twice before convicted of Theft." Id. 
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Such evidence was unfairly prejudicial and created a danger of confusing the 
issues and misleading the jury because it encouraged the jury to find guilt from improper 
reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,if37, 345 P.3d 1168 (noting the 
danger of unfair prejudice in gang evidence due "to the potential prejudice of' guilt by 
association"'); State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984) (reversing for misconduct 
where, among other things, prosecutor's reference to an alias "served no valid purpose" 
and "very likely may have led the jury to speculate as to defendant's reason for using an 
alias"); State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Utah 1983) ("Conviction ... cannot be had 
on the basis of ... guilt by association."); United States v. Barletta, 652 F.2d 218, 220 
(1st Cir. 1981) (upholding exclusion of conversation between defendant and informant 
even though relevant because "could legitimately be found prejudicial by virtue of its 
tendency to suggest a kind of 'guilt by association"'). Thus, even if State's Exhibit 2 had 
some scant relevance, it was inadmissible under rule 403. 
C. State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Was Not Certified, as 
Required by Rules 901 and 902 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
"By Utah law, any document, to be received in evidence, must be authenticated." 
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342,346 (Utah 1980). "Absent such authentication, no 
competent evidence is before the court that the document is what it purports to be." Id. 
"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, 
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what 
the proponent claims it is." Utah R.Evid. 90l(a). For public records, the authentication 
requirement may be satisfied by "[ e Jvidence that ... (A) a document was recorded or filed 
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in a public office as authorized by law; or ... (B) a purported public record or statement is 
from the office where items of this kind are kept." Utah R.Evid. 901(b)(7). 
A copy of a public record is "self-authenticating," meaning it "require[s] no 
extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted," 
if the copy is certified as correct by: 
(4)(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; 
or 
(4)(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of 
the United States or of this state. 
Utah R.Evid. 902( 4). 
State's Exhibit 2 did not "satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying 
an item of evidence" outlined in rule 901. Utah R.Evid. 901 ( a). The State did not even 
attempt to "produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 
proponent claims it is." Utah R.Evid. 901(a). In particular, it did not produce evidence 
that the exhibit "was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law" or that it 
was "from the office where items of this kind are kept." Utah R.Evid. 901(b)(7). Thus, 
the exhibit failed to satisfy the authenticity requirements of rule 901. 
Nor was State's Exhibit 2 "self-authenticating" under rule 902. Utah R.Evid. 902. 
"Rule 902 provides for the admissibility of certified copies of public records." State v. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545,550 (Utah 1996) (emphasis in original). Utah courts have 
held that a court record that has not been certified is not self-authenticating. See, e.g., 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51 (reversing for lack of authentication where the State 
offered into evidence a motion filed in the district court, signed by the prosecuting 
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attorney, and stamped with the judge's name, because it "was not certified by any 
official"); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 485-86 (Utah 1986) (reversing for lack of 
authentication where the State, relying on defendant's parole officer, "offered into 
evidence copies of certified copies of documents" showing prior convictions because ( 1) 
parole officer, "not the Utah state prison warden, certified the copies," and (2) "[t]here is 
no evidence to show how the copies got in [parole officer's] file, that the copies in 
[parole officer's] file constituted official documents of the Division of Corrections, or 
that [parole officer] was their official custodian or deputy custodian"); Lamorie, 610 P .2d 
at 346 (reversing for lack of authentication where "the State produced copies of ... court 
records, certified by a duly authorized notary public," because the notary "had no custody 
of the documents"; the notary was not "a deputy of the court clerk, the official custodian 
of the documents"; and "[n]owhere in the certification of the copy presented in court does 
the clerk's signature appear"). 
State's Exhibit 2 was not self-authenticating under rule 902(4)(A) because it was 
not "certified as correct by ... the custodian or another person authorized to make the 
certification." Utah R.Evid. 902(4)(A). It was also not self-authenticating under rule 
902(4)(B) because it was not "certified as correct by ... a certificate that complies with 
Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of the United States or of this state." Utah R.Evid. 
902(4)(B). Indeed, it was not certified at all. See R.175. Thus, as in Higginbotham, Long, 
and Lamorie, State's Exhibit 2 should have been excluded because it was an uncertified 
court record that lacked authentication. See Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51; Long, 721 
P.2d at 485-86; Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346. 
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D. State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Was Hearsay and It 
Did Not Qualify under Any Exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay. 
Hearsay is "a statement that ... the declarant does not make while testifying at the 
current trial or hearing; and ... a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement." Utah R.Evid. 801 ( c ). "Hearsay statements have been generally 
discredited because they ... lack trustworthiness' and also because 'the person purporting 
to know the facts is not stating them under oath."' In re K.D.S., 578 P .2d 9, 12 (Utah 
1978). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the rules of 
evidence]." Utah R.Evid. 802; see Utah R.Evid. 803, 804, 807. 
Here, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible because it was hearsay and it did not 
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule. State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay because it 
was a statement that the declarant did not make while testifying at trial and that the State 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R.Evid. 80l(c). First, State's 
Exhibit 2 was a statement that the declarant did not make while testifying at trial. The 
declarant of the Information was either "Pat Mount" or "M Falkner," who crossed out the 
name "Pat Mount" and signed in Pat Mount's place. R.175. The Arrest Warrant was 
signed by a magistrate judge. R.175. None of these people testified at trial. R.174. 
Moreover, at least parts of State's Exhibit 2 were double or triple hearsay, see Utah 
R.Evid. 805, because the declarant recounts statements made by "Pat Mount," "Troy 
Hyde," and "David Timmerman." R.175. Second, the State offered State's Exhibit 2 to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. The State offered the exhibit in order to impeach 
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Larsen by proving that Hale was Larsen's co-defendant in her Theft by Deception case. 3 
R.174: 149-50. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was hearsay. 
State's Exhibit 2 did not qualify under an exception to the hearsay rule. The rules 
of evidence allow the admission of hearsay evidence under certain limited circumstances. 
See Utah R.Evid. 803, 804, 807. The only exceptions that could apply here are the 
exceptions for records of a regularly conducted activity and public records. See Utah 
R.Evid. 803(6), 803(8). But State's Exhibit 2 did not satisfy either of these exceptions. 
The exception for records of a regularly conducted activity provides that the 
following is "not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available as a witness": 
(6) A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if: 
(6)(A) the record was made at or near the time by-or from information 
transmitted by-someone with knowledge; 
( 6)(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of 
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(6)(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
( 6)(0) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 
902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and 
( 6)(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
Utah R.Evid. 803(6). 
This exception was inapplicable because there is no evidence that State's Exhibit 2 
met any of the necessary conditions. See Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(A)-(C). The State did not 
3 As explained in Part I.A.I., State's Exhibit 2 it did not impeach Larsen's testimony. 
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call "the custodian or another qualified witness" to testify that the conditions were met. 
Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(D); see R.174. Nor was State's Exhibit 2 certified in a way "that 
complie[d] with Rule 902(11) or (12)." Utah R.Evid. 803(6)(0). Rule 902(11), the rule 
that applies to domestic records, such as State's Exhibit 2, requires "the custodian or 
another qualified person" to certify that the document "meets the requirements of Rule 
803(6)(A)-(C)." Utah R.Evid. 902(11). Here, as explained above, State's Exhibit 2 was 
not certified at all, let alone certified that the document met "the requirements of Rule 
803(6)(A)-(C)." Utah R.Evid. 902(11); see supra Part LC. 
The public records exception provides that the following is "not excluded by the 
rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness": 
(8) A record or statement of a public office if: 
(8)(A) it sets out: 
(8)(A)(i) the office's activities; 
(8)(A)(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not 
including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement 
personnel; or 
(8)(A)(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, 
factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and 
(8)(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a 
lack of trustworthiness. 
Utah R.Evid. 803(8). This exception was inapplicable because the State failed to establish 
that State's Exhibit 2 was a public record under the rule. R.174. The exception is also 
inapplicable because State's Exhibit 2 contained "matter[s] observed by law-enforcement 
personnel," which rule 803(8) excludes in criminal cases. Utah R.Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii). 
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Moreover, as recognized by this Court and our supreme court, police reports 
offered by the State in support of its prosecution are too unreliable to qualify under the 
business or public records exceptions of rule 803. See, e.g., State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 
1181, 1185-86 (Utah 1983); State v. Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27, 293 
P.3d 1121; Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (Utah Ct.App. 1990); State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292,298 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). As recognized in Bertul, Peronek, 
Morrell, and Gonzalez-Camargo, "police reports made for the purpose of prosecuting an 
offense and offered by the prosecution lack sufficient reliability so as to be admissible 
under the business records exception" or the public records exception. Peronek, 803 P.2d 
at 1297; see Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184; Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27 {"The 
State concedes that the admission of the incident report was prejudicial error."); Morrell, 
803 P.2d at 298 (stating general rule that "[p ]olice reports are not eligible for admission" 
under the business or public records exceptions of rule 803). This is because such reports 
are not made as part of regularly conducted business and are made with an eye toward 
prosecution, thereby undermining their reliability. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
129 S.Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009) (indicating that documents do not qualify for federal 
business records exception where "the regularly conducted business activity is the 
production of evidence for use at trial"). 
Like a police report, State's Exhibit 2, which contained an Information and the 
accompanying Arrest Warrant, see Utah R.Crim.P. 6, was "made for the purpose of 
prosecuting an offense." Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1297. An Information does not record 
"simple routine matters" that "are based on first-hand knowledge of the maker of the 
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report and do not involve conclusions"; nor are Informations prepared under 
circumstances that "'indicate their trustworthiness."' Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185-86. On the 
contrary, an Information is "an accusation in writing ... charging a person with a public 
offense." Utah Code §77-1-3(3) (2012). It is prepared by police officers based on police 
investigation and witness interviews with an eye toward prosecution. See Utah R.Crim.P. 
4(b), U). Indeed, the Information commences the prosecution. See Utah Code §77-2-2(3) 
(2012); Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). It also gives "notice of the charge," State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 
992, 995 n.8 (Utah 1978), and states allegations "sufficient to make out probable cause." 
Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b). Thus, State's Exhibit 2 should have been excluded because it was 
hearsay that did not qualify under any exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 
E. State's Exhibit 2 Was Not Admissible Because It Violated Clark's 
Right to Confrontation. 
The right to confrontation is a "bedrock procedural guarantee [that] applies to both 
federal and state prosecutions." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); see 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. Regardless of whether evidence is admissible under the rules of 
evidence, it may violate a defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 50-51. 
"Crawford provides that, in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, testimonial 
statements may be admitted only if the declarant is unavailable and if there has been a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination." Salt Lake City v. George, 2008 UT App 257,,I8, 
189 P.3d 1284; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. "The focus of the Confrontation Clause 
is on witnesses who bear testimony against the accused." Salt Lake City v. Williams, 2005 
UT App 493,,I15, 128 P.3d 47. "'"Testimony," in tum, is typically "[a] solemn 
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declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.""' 
Id. "A witness's testimony against a defendant is ... inadmissible unless the witness 
appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had the prior opportunity 
for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531. 
Although "Crawford did not provide a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,"' 
George, 2008 UT App 257,iJl 0, it made clear that "testimonial" "applies at a minimum to 
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to 
police interrogations." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66. Indeed, "'[s]tatements taken by police 
officers in the course of interrogations"' "qualify as testimonial under any definition." 
Williams, 2005 UT App 493,iJ16 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 1354). 
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court further clarified that police reports 
made with an eye toward prosecution are testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. 813, 822 & n.l 
(2006). To be testimonial, statements do not have to be made in response to police 
interrogation. Id. They may be "volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended 
questions." Id. Nor do statements have to be "reduced to a writing signed by the 
declarant." Id. at 826. They may be "embedded in memory (and perhaps notes) of the 
interrogating officer." Id. The test is whether the statements were made to the officer 
primarily "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
investigation." Id. at 823, 826-27. 
In short, "[ s ]tatements taken by police officers in the course of' an investigation 
are testimonial in nature. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. Likewise, statements made to police 
in order to establish events relevant to a criminal prosecution are testimonial. See Davis, 
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547 U.S. at 822; George, 2008 UT App 257,,Ii[l l-13 (calibration certificates are not 
testimonial because they are "prepared on a routine basis" using "preprinted language" 
and they are "not accusatory as against any particular defendant"); Salt Lake City v. 
Williams, 2005 UT App 493,,Il 7, 128 P.3d 47 (recognizing that "testimonial" includes 
statements where "'a reasonable person ... would objectively foresee that his statement 
might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime"'). 
"There is little doubt" that State's Exhibit 2 "fall[s] within 'the core class of 
testimonial statements"' outlined in Crawford. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532. As 
explained above, an Information is not a "routine" document prepared using "preprinted 
language" and "not accusatory as against any particular defendant." George, 2008 UT 
App 257,,I,Il 1-13; see supra Part I.D. On the contrary, it is "an accusation in writing" that 
charges a particular defendant with a particular offense. Utah Code §77-1-3(3) (2012). It 
is prepared by police officers with an eye toward prosecution. See Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b), 
G). It contains a statement of probable cause that repeats statements made to police 
officers primarily "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
investigation." Davis, 547 U.S. at 823, 826-27. And it relies on those statements to draw 
conclusions about the charges to be brought against a particular defendant. See Utah 
R.Crim.P. 4(b). Indeed, it commences the prosecution. See Utah Code §77-2-2(3) (2012); 
Utah R.Crim.P. 5(a). Further, the accompanying Arrest Warrant is a signed declaration 
that the magistrate believes there is probable cause to charge a particular person with a 
particular offense, and, in this case, that the magistrate believes "defendant will not 
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appear upon a summons" and that bail and an order to pursue if defendant flees are 
warranted. See Utah R.Crim.P. 6; R.175. 
In sum, '"a reasonable person ... would objectively foresee"' that an Information 
and its accompanying Arrest Warrant would be used as part of a criminal prosecution. 
Williams, 2005 UT App 493,,Il 7. Thus, State's Exhibit 2 was testimonial and its 
admission violated the Confrontation Clause because the State made no showing that the 
declarants-the officers who prepared the Information, the witnesses who made 
statements in support of the Information, and the magistrate who signed the Arrest 
Warrant-were unavailable, or that Clark had been given "a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." George, 2008 UT App 257,,I8. 
F. This Court Should Reverse Because the Admission of State's Exhibit 2 
Prejudiced Clark. 
This Court will "overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper evidence 'if 
the admission of the evidence ... reasonably [a]ffect[ed] the likelihood of a different 
verdict."' Toki, 2011 UT App 293,,I46. To show prejudice, a defendant need not show 
"that the jury would have more likely than not" returned a different verdict but for the 
error; rather, error is prejudicial if there is "a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,192, 152 P.3d 321. 
When assessing prejudice, the appellate court will view the case "in light of the 
'totality of the evidence,' not just the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Barela, 
2015 UT 22,131, ---P.3d--- (citation omitted). Even where the evidence suggests that "'it 
is highly probable that a properly instructed jury would have"' convicted, the appellate 
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court will reverse if "a properly instructed jury might still have" acquitted. Id. ,r,r28, 30 
n.6. This is because the appellate court has "no way of knowing" what a properly 
instructed jury would have done. Id. if30 n.6; see also State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 
1121-22 (Utah 1989) (explaining that the prejudice analysis is different than the 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis because it considers "all the evidence" and "focuses 
on the taint caused by the error" rather than on the sufficiency of the untainted evidence). 
Accordingly, in Barela, our supreme court reversed a rape conviction even though 
the verdict suggested that the jury rejected defendant's testimony that complainant 
instigated the sexual contact and accepted complainant's testimony that she did not 
consent. Barela, 2015 UT 22,,r,I28-32. Despite the telling verdict, the court had "no way 
of knowing how the jury processed the[] two stories." Id. if 30. A properly instructed jury 
"could have acquitted" based on a finding that even though defendant was the instigator 
and complainant did not consent, defendant "had neither knowledge nor recklessness as 
to [complainant]'s nonconsent." Id. if32. Because "a properly instructed jury might still 
have rendered a verdict in [defendant's] favor" even though it rejected his testimony, the 
error was "reasonably likely to have affected the verdict." Id. if28. 
In this case, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different but for the improper admission of State's Exhibit 2. 
There was no physical evidence or video evidence to support the State's case for retail 
theft. R.174. For example, the State did not produce the hooks that Davis claimed she 
took from Larsen and retained after Larsen left store. R. l 7 4: 107-08, 11 7. If the State had 
been able to produce those hooks, it would have produced physical evidence to contradict 
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Larsen's claim that she took the hooks with her when she left the store. But the State did 
not produce any physical evidence to support its case. R.174. 
Rather, the jury's decision came down to a weighing of credibility. The State's 
case rested on Davis's claim that she saw Clark attempt to steal hooks from the Smith's 
store. R.174. Whereas the defense case rested on Larsen's testimony that Clark was 
simply shopping for items she needed to cook dinner that night and that Davis was overly 
suspicious and jumped to the wrong conclusion. R.174. 
But for the unfair prejudice of State's Exhibit 2, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury would have accepted Larsen's testimony. Larsen admitted that she was 
Clark's friend and that she had been convicted of Theft by Deception. R.174:126, 145. 
But these admissions did not necessarily impeach her testimony. On the contrary, a 
reasonable jury could have believed Larsen's testimony despite these admissions. Larsen 
was forthright about her criminal behavior, explaining what she had done and why. 
R.174: 139-56. Larsen also provided a compelling reason to believe her testimony despite 
her friendship with Clark and her criminal conviction. Larsen testified that she would not 
lie for Clark because she believes people "should own their own ... problems." 
R.174: 154. Larsen explained that she took responsibility for her criminal conduct by 
pleading guilty, and she would expect Clark to do the same if she were guilty. R.174: 154. 
Larsen testified that Davis jumped to conclusions about her and Clark. According 
to Larsen, Davis approached her, immediately accused her of helping Clark steal items, 
and "wouldn't listen to" her. R.174: 128-32. Then she took Larsen's photograph and told 
Larsen "not to come in their store ever again." R.174:129-31. Despite the potential 
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problems with Larsen's credibility, the jury could have believed Larsen's claim that 
Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to conclusions. R.174: 128-32. 
This is particularly true given that there was evidence outside of Larsen's 
testimony to support the defense claim that Davis was overly suspicious and jumped to 
the wrong conclusion about Clark. Davis herself admitted that she targeted Clark as a 
shoplifter as soon as Clark entered the store. R.174:75-76. As soon as she saw Clark, she 
called the police and started following Clark around the store. R.174:75-76. Davis's 
testimony further suggested that she went to great lengths to keep an eye on Clark. 
R.174:98-99, 101. She "maintained visual" on Clark the entire time Clark was in the store 
even getting "down on [her] knees" when she had to. R.174:76, 101. Though Davis 
denied concealing herself from Clark, she admitted that she positioned herself in a way 
that Clark could not see her and that she spied on Clark though wire racks. R.174:98-99, 
101. The jury could have viewed Davis's testimony as the testimony of someone who 
pre-judged Clark and whose interpretations of Clark's movements were unreliable. 
Further, Davis provided inconsistent testimony that suggested her memory might 
have been affected by her desire to see Clark convicted. See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 
1270 (Utah 1987) (officers "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime"' may fail to objectively assess a case). At the preliminary hearing, Davis testified 
that Clark "wandered" through the store. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04. But, at trial, Davis 
testified that Clark's movements were deliberate-she walked "straight down" the home 
improvement aisle to the Command hooks area, "quickly walked" to and from the 
seasonal department, and headed "straight for the exit." R.174:77-81, 91, 95-100, 103-04. 
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When confronted with her inconsistent testimony, Davis claimed that she "misspoke" at 
the preliminary hearing. R.174:96-98, 100, 103-04, 111-13. 
Indeed, the record suggests that the jury continued to consider Larsen's version of 
the events despite the State's attempts to discredit her. After the State cross-examined 
Larsen, the jury asked two additional questions of Larsen. First, it asked Larsen why she 
would "knowingly cash a forged check for someone else." R.174: 156. Larsen responded 
that she "didn't know it was forged until [she] cashed it." R.174:156. The jury followed 
up with a second question: "[I]f someone else's payroll was not intended for you, ... why 
would you then spend the cash that you received from that check?" R.174: 156. Larsen 
responded that she spent the money because "I thought, ooh, money, you know, and I 
spent it. So that's why I pied guilty." R.174: 156. After Davis's rebuttal testimony the jury 
asked yet another question related to Larsen's credibility. R.17 4: 165. The jury asked 
Davis if the surveillance video showed whether there was a dog in Larsen's vehicle, 
apparently to assess whether Larsen had been telling the truth about entering the store 
after Clark because she was settling her dog in the car. Compare R.174: 128; with 
R.174: 165. Davis was unable to answer the question, saying it was too dark outside to tell 
whether there was a dog in the vehicle. R.174: 165. 
State's Exhibit 2, however, unfairly undermined Larsen's credibility. The exhibit 
was an official-looking, highly persuasive piece of evidence. See R.175. The Information 
was signed by a police officer under oath that the information contained therein was "true 
and correct to the best of my belief and knowledge." Id. It was authorized by the Deputy 
District Attorney. See id. And it was accompanied by an Arrest Warrant signed by a 
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magistrate judge. See id. As explained above, State's Exhibit 2 unfairly undermined 
Larsen's credibility by painting her as a dishonest person that even the magistrate 
distrusted. It also created an unfair danger that the jury would return a guilty verdict 
based on a finding of guilt by association. See supra Part LB. 
Moreover, the court did not give the jury a limiting instruction. R.174. Even when 
contradiction evidence is admissible, a trial court should admonish the jury to consider 
the evidence "only as it may bear on the ... credibility of the testimony." State v. Green, 
578 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1978); see State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396,,I27, 101 P.3d 846. 
In State v. Washington, therefore, our supreme court upheld the admission of 
contradiction evidence because the evidence was admissible and the trial court provided a 
limiting instruction. 476 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1970). During direct examination, 
"defendant denied having possession of the [stolen] property or knowledge that the same 
had been stolen." Id. at 1020. On cross-examination, the trial court permitted the State to 
impeach defendant's testimony with evidence that he possessed and used credit cards 
stolen at the same time as the charged items. Id. Where the trial court instructed the jury 
that the evidence was admitted "solely for the purpose of impeachment of the defendant 
and not to in any way prove or tend to prove the defendant's guilt of the charge," our 
supreme court held that there was "no prejudicial error in the action of the court." Id. at 
1021; see also Levin, 2004 UT App 396,,I,I24-26 (affirming admission of contradiction 
evidence where the evidence was admissible for impeachment and the trial court 
provided a limiting instruction); Green, 578 P.2d at 513 (same). 
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By contrast, in this case, State's Exhibit 2 was inadmissible and the trial court did 
not give a limiting instruction. R.174. This failure left the jury free to consider State's 
Exhibit 2 in whatever way it saw fit, including as evidence of Larsen's bad character and 
as evidence that Clark was guilty by association. Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that but for the erroneous admission of State's Exhibit 2 the jury would have acquitted. 
G. This Issue Is Preserved or It Should Be Addressed for Plain Error. 
Clark preserved her argument that admitting State's Exhibit 2 violated rules 402 
and 403, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. Alternatively, this Court should 
reverse for plain error. Clark did not preserve her argument that State's Exhibit 2 was 
inadmissible under rules 901 and 902, but that issue should be reversed for plain error. 
1. Clark Preserved Her Claims that State's Exhibit 2 Violated Rules 402 and 
403, the Hearsay Rules, and the Confrontation Clause. 
The "preservation requirement is self-imposed and is therefore one of prudence 
rather than jurisdiction." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,,rl3, 266 P.3d 828. It 
"serve[s] two important policies"-efficiency and fairness. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,,rl 1, 10 P.3d 346. "[R]equiring a party to raise an issue or argument in the trial court 
gives the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, 
correct it," which "avoid[s] unnecessary appeals and retrials." Patterson, 2011 UT 
68,ifl5. To preserve an issue for appeal, "counsel must raise the issue in the trial court 'in 
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."' State v. Bird, 
2015 UT 7,,rl0, 345 P.3d 1141. An appellate court will "look to three factors to 
determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: (1) whether the issue was 
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raised in a timely fashion, (2) whether it was raised specifically, (3) and whether the party 
'introduce[ d] supporting evidence or relevant legal authority."' Id. 
But the preservation requirement imposes "no obligation to 'preserve' ... citation 
to legal authority" or to fully flesh out the issue. Torian v. Craig, 2012 UT 63,i{20, 289 
P .3d 4 79. Once "the foundation of a claim or argument is presented in a manner that 
allows the district court to rule on it, a party challenging the lower court's resolution of 
that matter is free to marshal any legal authority that may be relevant to its consideration 
on appeal." Id.; see In re Adoption of J.MS., 2015 UT 35,i{9, 345 P.3d 709 (statutory and 
constitutional arguments preserved even though arguments below "were relatively 
superficial" because "the statutory and constitutional aspects of [the] case were presented 
to the district court"); Patterson, 2011 UT 68,,Il8 (appellate courts "routinely consider 
new authority relevant to issues that have properly been preserved"). 
Nor does preservation "tum on the use of magic words or phrases." In re Baby 
Girl T., 2012 UT 78,,I38, 298 P.3d 1251. An issue will be deemed preserved even if it 
was raised indirectly so long as it was "raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial judge [ could] consider it."' Id. i{34. Thus, in Baby Girl T., our supreme court held 
that the due process issue was preserved even though appellant "failed to expressly 
articulate the due process clause as the basis of his constitutional claim" because "the 
record clearly demonstrate[d] his argument was founded in the due process clause." Id. 
,I33; see, e.g., State v. Garcia, 2007 UT App 228,,Il 0, 164 P.3d 1264 (State's argument 
relying on Franks doctrine was preserved even though "the State did not formally cite the 
Franks case below" because it "argued the underlying premise of the Franks doctrine" 
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and this Court had "no doubt the trial court was on notice of the State's legal argument"); 
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270,272 (Utah 1992) (although "[defendant's] 
objections were not textbook examples of specificity," they nonetheless "adequately 
directed the trial judge's attention to the claimed error" such that "they were sufficient"). 
When deciding whether an issue is preserved, the appellate court will consider the 
context of the objection. See Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,iJ26. In Gonzalez, therefore, our 
supreme court held that the issue was preserved even though the objection did not 
specifically raise the issue because the "specific ground for [the] objection [wa]s clear 
from" the context of the trial. Id. Likewise, in Baird v. Baird, our supreme court held that 
the issue was preserved even though appellant did not specifically raise the issue because 
"the district court necessarily had to consider" the issue as part of its decision to enter the 
stalking injunction. 2014 UT 8,iJiJ18-20, 322 P.3d 728. 
The appellate court will also consider the circumstances in which the objection 
was made. See Bird, 2015 UT 7,iJl l. Thus, in Bird, our supreme court held that the issue 
was preserved even though "defense counsel did not introduce relevant legal authority" 
because the issue came up at trial and "counsel was given only a brief moment to review 
the ... instructions and make her objection." 2015 UT 7,iJiJ4, 11. 
Here, Clark preserved her claims regarding rules 402 and 403, the hearsay rules, 
and the Confrontation Clause. Regarding rule 402, Clark argues that State's Exhibit 2 
was irrelevant for the stated purpose of impeachment because it did not impeach Larsen's 
testimony and, even if it did, it was impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter. 
Regarding rule 403, Clark argues that even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some scant 
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probative value for impeachment it was still inadmissible because the probative value, if 
any, was limited to the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as 
co-defendants and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury created by the remainder of the exhibit. 
Finally, regarding the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause, Clark argues that 
State's Exhibit 2 was created with an eye toward prosecution and, as such, constituted 
testimonial hearsay that violated the hearsay rules and the right to confrontation. 
These issues are preserved because Clark raised a timely, specific objection and 
identified relevant legal authority. Bird, 2015 UT 7,,IIO. First, Clark's objection to State's 
Exhibit 2 was timely because she objected at the first opportunity and before the exhibit 
was admitted into evidence, thus giving "the court 'an opportunity to address [the] 
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."' Holgate, 2000 UT 74,,Il 1; see R.174: 150. 
Second, Clark's objection was specific and identified relevant legal authority. 
Clark objected to State's Exhibit 2 below for the same reasons she now raises on appeal. 
Clark objected to the exhibit's relevancy because (1) the exhibit did not impeach Larsen 
because Larsen "is not an attorney. She doesn't know how court dockets work, how 
people are charged"; and (2) the proposed line of impeachment was irrelevant because 
"whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged together" was not "relevant here." R.174:150. 
Clark objected to the exhibit's admissibility even if it contained some probative value for 
impeachment because it was "not just going to whether [Larsen and Hale] were charged 
together." R.174: 150. And Clark objected to the hearsay nature of the exhibit by arguing 
that "an Information is allegations not a conviction." R.174:150. 
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Clark did not specifically cite rules 402 and 403, the hearsay rules, or the 
Confrontation Clause, but such specific references were not necessary. As explained 
above, Clark was under "no obligation to 'preserve' ... citation to legal authority" or to 
fully flesh out the issue. Torian, 2012 UT 63,iJ20. Her objection raised the issues "to a 
level of consciousness such that the trial judge [could] consider [them]."' Baby Girl T., 
2012 UT 78,iJ34. Moreover, she made her objection during the heat of trial when she had 
"only a brief moment to review" the exhibit "and make her objection." Bird, 2015 UT 
7,iJiJ4, 11. Thus, as in Bird, Gonzalez, Baby Girl T, Garcia, and Nielsen, Clark's objection 
was adequate to preserve Clark's claims that admitting State's Exhibit 2 violated rules 
402 and 403, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation Clause. 
2. Alternatively, this Court Should Review the Issues for Plain Error. 
If this Court concludes that any portion of Clark's argument is not preserved, this 
Court should reverse because admitting State's Exhibit 2 into evidence was plain error. 
"The plain error doctrine is an exception to the general rule of preservation-its 'purpose 
is to permit [the appellate court] to avoid injustice."' Jones, 2015 UT 19,iJ49. To show 
plain error, a defendant must "establish that: '(i) [an] error exists; (ii) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant."' Id. 
In this case, as explained above, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
State's Exhibit 2. See supra Parts I.A.-1.E. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, the 
error was harmful. See supra Part I.F. Finally, as explained below, the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court. "When a jury hears a case, the court is required to conduct 
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the trial 'so that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means."' In re 
N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249,iJS, 338 P.3d 226 (quoting Utah R.Evid. 103(d)). 
In this case, it should have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2 
was inadmissible under rule 402. It is well-settled that "[i]rrelevant evidence is not 
admissible," Utah R.Evid. 402, and that evidence is irrelevant if it '"has no probative 
value to a fact at issue."' Smedley, 2003 UT App 79,iJ15; see Utah R.Evid. 401. In 
particular, it is well-settled that evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment is not 
relevant unless it casts doubt on the witness's credibility. See, e.g., Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 
291; Stewart, 925 P.2d at 600. As well, it is well-settled that evidence offered to 
contradict a statement made by the witness during cross-examination is not admissible if 
it is irrelevant or collateral. See, e.g., Mitchell, 571 P.2d at 1355. Indeed, the collateral 
rule is "fundamental" and predates the rules of evidence. Warledo, 557 F.2d at 725. 
It should also have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2 was 
inadmissible under rule 403. It is well-settled that evidence is inadmissible "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Utah R.Evid. 403. lt is 
also well-settled that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if "'it has a tendency to influence the 
outcome of the trial by improper means."' Toki, 2011 UT App 293, iJ44 (citing State v. 
Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)). Finally, it is well-settled that a trial court 
applying the rule 403 analysis should balance the probative value of the evidence against 
its prejudicial effect to ensure that matters of '"scant"' probative force are not "'dragged 
in by the heels for the sake of [their] prejudicial effect."' Bartley, 784 P .2d at 123 7. 
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In this case, the trial court heard Larsen testify and saw State's Exhibit 2. It should 
have been obvious to the court that State's Exhibit 2 was irrelevant for the stated purpose 
of impeachment because it did not impeach Larsen's testimony and, even if it did, it was 
impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter. Additionally, it should have been 
obvious to the court that even if State's Exhibit 2 contained some scant probative value 
for impeachment it was still inadmissible because the probative value, if any, was limited 
to the portion of the Information's caption that listed Larsen and Hale as co-defendants 
and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
or misleading the jury created by the remainder of the exhibit. 
Additionally, it should have been obvious to the trial court that State's Exhibit 2 
was inadmissible under rules 901 and 902, the hearsay rules, and the Confrontation 
Clause. It is well-settled that "any document, to be received in evidence, must be 
authenticated." Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346; see, e.g., Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549-51; 
Long, 721 P.2d at 485-86; Utah R.Evid. 901, 902. It is well-settled that hearsay is 
inadmissible unless it qualifies for an exception to the rule against hearsay. See Utah 
R.Evid. 801-802. The qualifications for the hearsay exceptions are also well-settled. See 
Utah R.Evid. 803-804, 807. Moreover, it is well-settled that items like police reports are 
inadmissible when offered by the prosecution. See, e.g., Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185-86; 
Gonzalez-Camargo, 2012 UT App 366,,r27; Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1297-98; Morrell, 803 
P.2d at 298. Additionally, it is well-settled that testimonial statements are not admissible 
unless the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity to cross-
examine. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54; George, 2008 UT App 257,,r8. Finally, 
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it is well-settled that statements are testimonial when "'a reasonable person ... would 
objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of 
a crime."' Williams, 2005 UT App 493,ill 7; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
Indeed, the error should have been particularly obvious because defense counsel 
objected to the evidence and explained why the evidence was inadmissible. R.174:150. 
Thus, even if any portion of Clark's argument is not preserved, this Court should reverse 
because admitting State's Exhibit 2 constituted plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
Clark asks this Court to reverse the conviction for Retail Theft and remand for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this 21_ day of May, 2015. 
~ s. ~ 
LORI J. SEPPI ~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF tJTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBBRA JO CLARK, 
Defendant. 
custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: loriaw 
Prosecutor! LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 131401488 PS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: September 29, 2014 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CHESNUT, HEATHER J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 31, 1960 
Sheriff Office#: 220472 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 9.55-10.13 
CHARGES 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING.) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition~ 08/27/2014 Guilty 
2. CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING ENTRY UNLAWFUL - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty "Disposition: 08/27/2014 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RETAIL THEFT {SHOPLIPT'ING) a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah state Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL TRESPASS KNOWING 
ENTRY UNLAWFUL a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 
180 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 121 day(e) previously served. 
Printed: 10/01/14 14:24:30 Pagel 
case No: 131401488 Date: Sep 29, 2014 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge# l Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $4750.00 
Surcha.rge: $135. 79 
Oue: $250.00 
Charge# 2 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $750.00 
Surcharge~ $135.79 
Due: $250.00 
Tot-al Fine: $6000.00 
Total suspended: $S500.00 
Total surcharge: $271.58 
Total Principal Due: $500.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 Rate to be determined by ap&p. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of~ SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole~ 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Repor·t to AP&P within 24 hours of release from jail.. 
Enter into and complete any treatment recounnended by AP&P. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments on all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Dollar for dollar credit towards the fine for treatment expenses 
excluding urinalysis charges. 
Not to possess or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol 
substances. 
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are sold. 
Enroll and complete CA.TS P.rogram and aftercare~ 
Court will consider early release upon successful completion of 
CATS. 
Obtain High School diploma or GED. 
Printed: 10/01/14 14:24:30 Page 2 
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Case No: 131401488 Date: Sep 29, 2014 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
$for$ credit towards any education. 
No contact with Debbie Larsen 
This is a ZERO TOLERANCE probation 
Pay attorney fees in the amount for 
by ap&p. 
Date: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LA.KE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBBRA JO CLARK, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 131401488 
) 
) Transcript of: 
) 
) JURY TRIAL 
) 
) 
__________ ) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN 
WEST JORDAN COURTHOUSE 
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088 
AUGUST 27, 2014 
TRANSCRIBED BY: BRAD YOUNG FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 1 8 2014 
1 * * * 
2 (State's Exhibit 1 was received into evidence.) 
3 * * * 
4 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you. If I could mark that, your 
5 Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Please. 
7 :MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you, your Honor. The State 
8 rests. 
9 THE COURT: All right. The State has rested. 
10 Ms. Chesnut, do you anticipate calling any witnesses 
11 today? 
12 MS. CHESNUT: Yes, your Honor. The Defense would 
13 call Debbie Clark -- or, pardon me, Debbie Larsen. 
14 THE COURT: Ms. Larsen, why don't you come forward 
15 and be sworn. 
16 (The witness was sworn.) 
17 
18 
19 
THE COURT: Just have a seat. 
* * * 
DEBBIE LARSEN, 
20 called as a witness by the Defendant, having been duly sworn, 
21 was examined and testified as follows: 
22 * * * 
23 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 4 BY MS . CHESNUT: 
25 Q. Ms. Larsen, will you state your full name and spell 
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1 your last name for the record? 
2 A. Debbie Larsen, L-a-r-s-e-n. 
3 Q. And, um, do you know a person Debbra Clark? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
And do you see her in the courtroom? 
Yes. 
And where is she? 
Right there. 
Sitting at the Defense counsel table? 
Yeah. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the 
identification by Ms. Larsen of Ms. Clark. 
Q. And how do you know her? 
14 A. I've known her for about five years. She has been a 
15 friend for quite awhile. 
16 Q. Okay. Now, do you remember going to a Smith's store 
17 with her back on November 30th of last year? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. Now, was anyone else with the two of you? 
20 A. No, just my dog. 
21 Q. How did you get to the store? 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Drive. 
Whose car? 
Mine. 
Did you drive? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
I drove, yeah. 
Now, in your mind, what were the two ot you doing at 
3 the store? 
4 
5 
6 
A. We were -- well, I was taking some things, some items 
back that I had purchased, and she was supposed to go get stuff 
for dinner, because we were going to have dinner, and that was 
7 what we was there for. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Q. Okay. Now, you said you were taking things back to 
the store. What were you taking back? 
A. Some Mirilax, Fleet and Gas-Ex and then two hooks. 
Ar1d I had a receipt for everything but the two hooks. 
Q. 
Gas-Ex? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. So you had a receipt for the Mirilax 
Yeah. 
What was the other item? 
Two hooks. 
Okay. So Mirilax, Gas-Ex and two hooks? 
And Fleet, yeah. 
Oh, okay, is that a medication? 
and the 
Fleet? 
Yeah. 
Okay. So you had a receipt for the medications but 
22 not the hooks? 
! 
!" i 
i 
I 
~ 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yeah. ~ 
Okay. Um, did you purchase the medications? 
Yeah. 
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Okay. And where did you purchase those? 1 
2 
3 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Um, on, what is it, 4100 South and Redwood Road. 
Okay. Is that the same Smith's store where you were 
4 returning them on November 30th? 
5 A. No. I was returning them on the one that we went to. 
6 Q. Okay. What about the -- the two hooks? You say you 
7 didn't have a receipt for them? 
8 A. No, I didn't have a receipt for them. They were my 
9 boyfriend's, and he never keeps his receipts for anything, and 
10 so he told me to take them back, and so I took them back with 
11 my stuff, and they came up to me and accused me of having her 
12 hand them off to me in the store. 
13 Q. Okay, let's take it one step at a time. 
14 A. Okay. 
15 Q. So you -- you went into the store. Did you go in the 
16 store with Debbra Clark? 
17 A. Yeah -- well, not right with her. I had to settle my 
18 dog and roll the windows down a little, so I was probably three 
19 to five minutes behind her. 
20 Q. Okay. And did you go into the store? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
23 store? 
24 A. 
25 door. 
Yeah. 
What's the first thing you did when you went into the 
Turned to the service booth. It was right inside the 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay. And what did you do there? 
A. I proceeded to return the items. There was one 
person ahead of me, so I just waited for them, and then it was 
my turn, and they were giving me back my money. 
Q. Okay. And this was for all five items, the Fleet, 
the Mirilax, the Gas-Ex and the two hooks? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did you actually get the money? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Why not? 
A. Because they came and asked if I knew a Debbie Clark 
and if I was with her, and I said yes, and they told me that 
that not to come in their store ever again, that she was 
stealing, and I had like items to what she was stealing. 
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the items. So how -- so 
these hooks, urn, about -- do you remember about how much you 
were receiving on a return for them? 
A. Like they were like $9 apiece. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember the amount on the other three 
items, the medications? 
A. It was I believe 68. 
Q. Okay. Um, is that was that the total amount you 
were receiving back or --
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- just for the medications? 
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1 
2 
A. 
Q. 
3 that? 
4 
5 
6 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No, they were giving it all back to me. 
So you were receiving about $68 back from all of 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. Do you remember what these hooks looked like? 
Yeah. They were just white hooks that you stick on 
7 your wall and hang things, but they were too thick for my wall. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
wall 
Q. 
A. 
and 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
The ones that show on TV where they stick to your 
you don't ruin your wall. 
What do you mean they were too thick for your wall? 
They were too wide, I guess you would say, for my 
13 wall, for -- it looked funny with the picture, so I didn't put 
14 it up. 
15 Q. Okay, now, you said that you were interrupted, 
16 someone came and talked to you about Debbra Clark? 
17 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Um, was the return completed ever? 
It was done to where they -- he had out the money and 
20 everything to hand me back, and they was giving me a gift card 
21 for the two clamps and had everything ready, and then they came 
22 over and asked if I knew her, and they stopped everything and 
23 just said -- they didn't give me nothing back. 
24 Q. You said they were giving you a gift card for the two 
25 clamps? 
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1 A. Yeah. Because I didn't have a receipt for them. 
2 They was going to give me a Smith's gift card. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you 
Yeah. 
So the 
Yeah. 
Okay. 
mean the hooks? 
same thing? 
So, um, now, what happened at that point when 
8 they stopped you and talked to you about Debbra? Did you stay 
9 there, go somewhere? 
10 A. We stayed there. And they took a picture of me and 
11 told me that Debbie Clark was stealing items, and that she 
12 passed it off, them hooks off to me in the store. And I begged 
13 them t<.) go look at their camera, because they would see I 
14 didn't even pass her in the store. And the lady started just 
15 screaming at me and wouldn't listen to me to go look at he.r. 
16 cameras or anything. 
17 
18 
19 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What lady was that? 
She is the blonde lady that was here earlier. 
Okay. And whatever happened to these hooks and 
20 medications? 
21 A. Um, I took them back to Smith's by where I live. 
22 Q. All five items? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. So the medications and the hooks? 
25 A. Uh-huh. 
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I 
[, 
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1 Q. And did you get a return there? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. So they wouldn't complete the return at the 
4 store --
5 A. No. 
6 Q. -- where you were with Debbie Clark? 
7 A. Nope. 
8 Q. Okay. You said that you asked them to look at 
9 surveillance video? 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. Did you ever see whether they did that? 
12 A. No, I didn't. But I begged them to do that so they 
13 would see that she didn 1 t pass me anything. 
14 Q. Okay. And were you ever charged with anything? 
15 A. No. But they told me if I ever went back to Smith's 
16 again I would be trespassing. And I had a receipt for my 
17 stuff. I never stole nothing. And I was trying to talk to 
18 this lady rationally and tell her hey, but she was hysterical. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. She just, you know, took a picture of me and said 
21 never come back here. 
22 Q. Okay. Um, what about the receipt you had for these 
medications? 23 
24 A. Yeah, I tried to talk to them about that, too, and 
25 still she was -- she wouldn't Listen to me. 
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1 
2 
Q. 
A. 
What happened -- do you still have the receipt? 
No. When I -- when I took it back to the other 
3 Smith's I gave them the receipt. 
4 Q. Okay. Um, all right. Did you, urn, ever attempt to 
5 tell this woman or anybody else about where you got these 
6 medications or hooks or show them the receipt? Did you ever 
7 
8 
tell them about that? 
A: I told them that I got them on Smith's on 41st, on 
9 4100 South and Redwood. 
10 
11 
12 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
13 hooks? 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
And that's -- that's all I told them. 
Okay. Um, did you tell them where you got these 
What do you mean? 
The hooks you were trying to return? 
Oh, yeah. I just told them my boyfriend don't keep 
17 receipts, and I don't have the receipts for these two items. 
18 
19 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. Did you 
And they said, "That's fine. We will give you a gift 
20 card for that and we will give you your cash back for the 
21 other." 
22 Q. Okay. So you were getting a gift card for the hooks 
23 because you didn't have a receipt? 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah. 
Okay. Um, did you ever see Debbra Clark, urn, at any 
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1 point after attempting to make this return that day? 
2 A. No, I never saw her. 
3 MS. CHESNUT: Okay. That's all I have. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Lopresto, cross-examination? 
5 MR. LOPRESTO: Yes, your Honor. 
6 * * * 
7 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. LOPRESTO: 
9 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Larsen. 
10 A. Hi. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Hi. Um, what is your full name? 
Debbie Larsen. 
Is your -- do you go by Debbie Child Larsen? 
Yeah. 
Is Child a previous last name of yours? 
That's my maiden name. 
Okay. And your birth date is March 8th, 1967? 
Uh-huh. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q. Okay. And you live at 3810 South Redwood Road; is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And so tell me if I'm wrong, but it sounds 
23 like you purchased the items, except for the hooks --
24 A. Yeah. 
25 Q. -- at the Smith's right down the street from where 
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1 you live? 
2 
3 
A. 
Q. 
4 those? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yeah. 
Okay. Um, but the two hooks, you didn't purchase 
No. My boyfriend did. 
Okay. And your boyfriend 1 s name is J.D. Cook? 
No, it's Jeff. 
Okay. And he asked you to take those back, right? 
Yeah -- well, no, he ctictn•t ask me. They didn't work 
10 with the pictures that I have, so I took them back, because 
11 they were the wrong size for my wall. 
12 
13 
14 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. What's your boyfriend's last name? 
Knowles, K-n-o-w-1-e-s. 
Um, so he bought the hooks for you, just didn't keep 
15 the receipt? 
16 
17 
18 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
19 them back. 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
He just bought the wrong ones, yeah. 
Okay. And when did he buy those for you? 
Um, like the week previously before I went to take 
Okay. 
They had been sitting in my car along with the stuff 
22 in the back, and I hadn't -- I hadn't got to the store to take 
23 them back yet, so it was probably a couple of weeks, maybe, at 
24 the most. 
25 Q. Okay. And so you had them in your car when you went 
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1 to go pick up Ms. Clark? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. And did Ms. Clark tell you that she wanted you 
4 to take her to Smith's? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Yeah -- wel1, no, we just decided we were going to 
have dinner, and she was going to cook dinner for us, and so we 
went to Smith's to get stuff for dinner. 
Q. Okay. So who -- who is the other person? You said 
that Ms. Clark was going to cook dinner for us. Was that just 
you and Ms. Clark or were there other people involved? 
A. There was Jeff and -- I think just me and Jeff. 
Q. Okay. So you and Ms. Clark and Jeff? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So were all of you over at your house? 
A. My house, yeah. But she lived by that Smith's. 
That's why we stopped there. 
Q. Okay. So you live at about 3800 South Redwood? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And you were at that location, correct, when 
Ms. Clark said she wanted to make dinner for you? 
A. We were at my house. 
Q. Where is your house? 
A. 3810 South. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. And Ms. Clark was there with you? 
Yeah. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
9th 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
East; 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. And -- okay. So you drove to the store? 
Uh-huh. 
And the store that you drove to was at 4500 South and 
is that correct? 
Yeah. 
Okay. But you said that it took you about five 
7 minutes or so after Mr. Clark entered the store before you did, 
8 right? 
9 A. Yeah. I had my dog in the car, so I settled him 
10 down, and then I -- I won't leave him in there for long. So 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
But this was in November, right? 
Yeah. 
Was it cold at that point? 
Yeah. That's why I got him settled down and stuff. 
Now, you said that after a couple of minutes, after 
16 about five minutes or so you entered the store and went to do 
17 this return; is that right? 
18 A. Uh··-huh. 
19 Q. And at some point loss prevention caine up to you, 
~ 
~ 
-~-
20 correct? ~-
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And you had been standing there for, what, 10 
23 minutes? ~-
24 A. Ten minutes about. 
25 Q. And, all of a sudden, these people just show up, 
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1 correct? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Yeah, out of nowhere. A. 
Q. All right. And they -- they asked you if you were 
there with Debbra Clark, didn't they? 
A. Yeah. Yeah. 
Q. But your testimony is that you said you were there 
with Debbra Clark? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You didn't tell them that you weren't there with 
Debbra Clark? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't tell them that you didn't know who Debbra 
Clark was? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, you have known Debbra Clark for a long time, 
right? You are good friends? 
THE COURT: You need to answer out loud, ma'am. 
THE WITNESS: What? 
THE COURT: You were nodding your head. We are on 
the record. The record doesn't reflect the nods. 
THE WITNESS: Okay~ Yes. 
Q. You are good friends? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How often would you say, uh, you get together with 
Ms. Clark? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
week. 
Q. 
week? 
A. 
Q. 
Probably once a week. 
So once a week for the past five years? 
Yeah. 
Okay. So that would be --
Sometimes longer, but mostly we see each other once a 
Do you see each other more frequently than once a 
No, not really. 
Okay. So it is generally once a week, sometimes a 
11 little bit more time? 
Yeah. 
Is that right? 
Yeah. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. And when you see Ms. Clark, do you see her alone or 
16 do you see her with other friends? 
17 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Um, I see her with one other friend sometimes. 
And who is that? 
Wanda. Which she is my friend too, now. I was 
20 introduced through Debbie to her. She is a good lady. 
21 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
24 Ms. Clark? 
25 A. 
So you never see Ms. Clark with Christian Hale? 
Yes. 
Okay. And what is Mr. Hale's relationship to 
They were boyfriend and girlfriend. 
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1 Q. Okay. And so on these times that you got together 
2 with Ms. Clark was Mr. Hale with you or --
3 MS. CHESNUT: Objection to relevance, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Overruled. 
5 Q. So these times that you were together with Mr. Clark, 
6 Mr. Hale is with her? 
7 A. Sometimes he was with her but not all the time. He 
8 wasn't there this time. 
9 Q. Okay. These times that you have gotten together with 
10 Ms. Clark and Mr. Hale, has it been like the same type of 
11 scenario, though, like having dinner together, that type of 
12 stuff? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah, stuff like that. 
Okay. So you know Mr. Hale? 
Yeah. 
Okay. And you know Mr. Hale and Ms. Clark were 
17 boyfriend and girlfriend, right? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah. 
Okay. Do you know about when they were boyfriend and 
20 girlfriend? 
21 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, again, objection to 
22 relevance. I don't see how this is relevant to the charge. 
23 
24 witness. 
25 
MR. LOPRESTO: Your Honor, this is Defendant's 
THE COURT: I'm going to give a little leeway, but 
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1 make it quick. 
2 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you. 
3 Q. Do you know about when Mr. Hale and Ms. Clark were 
4 boyfriend and girlfriend? 
5 
6 many. 
7 
8 
9 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
No. I know it had been years, but I don't know how 
Okay. When is the last time you had seen Mr. Hale? 
It had probably been a month or so before then. 
Okay. And is that the time when you and Mr. Hale 
10 were passing forged checks? 
11 
12 
13 
MS. CHESNUT: Objection, your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: No, we --
THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait, wait. Counsel, if 
14 there is a 609 issue, I think you simply have to ask her if she 
15 has been 
16 MR. IDPRESTO: It's a 608 issue, your Honor. 608 
17 specifically allows me to go into the instances of conduct that 
18 the defendant -- or that the witness has engaged in, with 
19 regards to her truthfulness. 
20 THE COURT: Ms. Chesnut, the rule does say in 
21 subsection (b) that the Court may on cross-examination allow 
22 them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character 
23 for truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness. 
24 MS. CHESNUT: All right, well, your Honor, I don't 
25 have any information about what Mr. Lopresto is delving in here 
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1 to. I would ask to have a chance to examine it so I can 
2 properly respond. 
3 THE COURT: Do you have evidence of a conviction for 
4 that? 
5 MR. LOPRESTO: Your Honor, I have an Information and 
6 I have a docket from this court that I plan on presenting to 
7 Ms. Larsen during cross-examination. I would also remind the 
8 Court that the State was only made aware of this witness --
9 THE COURT: I understand. 
10 MR. I.OPRESTO: I found out about this information 
11 during the lunch hour. And if this is Defendant's witness, I 
12 would certainly think that Defendant would know about this 
13 particular issue. 
14 THE COURT: I'm going to allow you to proceed under 
15 Rule 608 (b) • 
16 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you. 
17 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, I still would like the 
18 chance to examine what he is using. I haven't seen that. 
19 THE COURT: Why don't you show Ms. Chesnut. 
20 MS. CHESNUT: Well, your Honor, I base -- I object 
21 based on that this is -- appears to be a conviction, which is 
22 governed by Rule 609, regardless of 608. It is not a felony. 
23 It is not a -- let's see -- I would argue it's not a crime of 
24 truthfulness, without more information, and, um, certainly, I 
25 think we would have to have the plea paperwork to see exactly 
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1 
2 
3 
what the plea was to 
THE COURT: 
MS. CHESNUT: 
Let me see the document. 
-- especially if Mr. Lopresto is 
4 offering this as a specific instance, which I would -- you 
5 know, I think it has to be governed by Rule 609. 
6 THE COURT: Um, I'm going to allow you to proceed. 
7 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, I would like to make 
9 further argument for the record as well as a motion for 
10 mistrial. 
11 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
12 MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, um, to be a little bit more 
13 clear, Mr. Lopresto is attempting to enter this under Rule 
14 608(b) without regard to Rule 609. um, as the Court is aware, 
15 the rules have to be read in conjunction with, in harmony with 
16 each other. Um, this is something that we don't have specific 
17 inforrnation about with regard to what exactly specifiG conduct 
18 was underlying this plea. It also, wn, involves somebody who 
19 was not involved in this case, according to the State's own 
20 evidence. And I would also make a motion for a mistrial on the 
21 basis that it is improper evidence under both Rule 608 and 609, 
22 and that, yet, it has been entered without an in limine rnotion. 
23 THE COURT: Well, Ms. Chesnut, it's your witness. 
24 You only gave notice to Mr. Lopresto this morning. This is a 
25 plea to a theft by deception, which in this Court's opinion is 
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1 admissible under Rule 609, and Rule 608 specifically indicates 
2 that the Court may on cross-examination allow them to be 
3 inquired into if they are probative of the character for 
4 truthfulness or untruthfulness. I find that it is. You may 
5 proceed. The motion for mistrial is denied. Although, I'm 
6 going to require that a certified copy -- is that a certified 
7 copy? 
8 MR. LOPRESTO: It isn't, your Honor. And again, I 
9 only asked her about her passing bad checks with the 
10 defendant's boyfriend. I did not offer into evidence a 
11 certified copy of a conviction. I was going under 608 and 
12 speaking about prior instances of conduct. 
13 Moreover, I would ask the Court to take judicial 
14 notice of the case number that 1 s being inquired into. This is 
15 something that's available to the Court and I think the Court 
16 can divine from its own information that there is a conviction, 
17 but because the State only received notice of this witness this 
18 morning I didn't have the opportunity to get a certified copy 
19 of the conviction. Now, if the Court would allow me, I could 
20 do that before this case is rested. I can go to the clerk's 
21 office and ask them to stamp the certified copy of the 
22 conviction. 
23 THE COURT: I'm going to allow you to do that. 
24 That's the proper way to have· it done. 
25 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you . 
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1 Q. Now, Ms. Larsen, uh, you pled guilty about five days 
2 after this incident at Smith's to forgery as a third-degree 
3 felony? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. And in that case you admitted that your boyfriend was 
6 the individual who had been purchasing payroll checks; is that 
7 correct? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
It wasn't my boyfriend that was doing it. 
Post-Miranda, you didn't admit to --
No, it was J.D. Cook. It was J.D. Cook. 
Let me please answer -- or ask the question. From a 
12 long-time friend J.D. Cook? 
13 A. My boyfriend wasn't it. She gave it to me 
14 personally. 
15 Q. Okay. And you were charged with the defendant's 
16 boyfriend, Christian Hale? 
17 A. No, we didn't have -- we weren't charged together. 
18 We never went together. 
19 Q. I'm going to show you what has been marked State's 
20 Exhibit No. 2. Do you recognize that document? 
21 A. Yeah. There was some mix-up in my court case, 
22 because they said that for some reason he is tacked on the end 
23 of mine, when we never had trial together, never had court 
24 together or nothing at all. 
25 Q. Is Mr. Hale's name on that Information? 
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1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A. Yes. But he -- we didn't go to court together or any 
of that stuff. 
Q. It's because you pled guilty; isn't that right? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't have trial, did you? 
A. No. I don't know why they didn't I don't know why 
they did it like that. I have no idea. But I never went with 
him to cash a check. I went with J.D. Cook. 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, I would like -- I would ask 
10 for a correction on the record. She is not -- was not 
11 convicted of a third-degree felony. 
12 MR. LOPRESTO: And that's correct, your Honor. I 
13 apologize. 
14 THE WITNESS: No, I'm not. 
15 MR. IDPRESTO: It was a theft by deception. 
16 THE COURT: I understand. That was what I said 
17 before. Members of the jury, you are instructed that 
18 Ms. Larsen was not convicted of a third-degree felony forgery. 
19 She was convicted of a class A misdemeanor theft by deception, 
20 as I previously indicated, based upon my review of the docket. 
21 Okay? 
22 Q. So your friend supplied you with payroll checks that 
23 you attempted --
24 A. No, she made the check. 
25 Q. Okay. And then you went into Wells Fargo and you 
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1 tried to cash that check? 
2 A. And I didn't -- yeah, I did not know that check 
3 was ..-- I thought it wa.s regular check . 
4 
5 
Q. 
A. 
But you pled guilty to theft by deception? 
I know. I went to my bank first, and they wouldn't 
6 let me do it, because I didn't have funds in it. So I went to 
7 Wells Fargo, she took me to Wells Fargo, and when I got out of 
8 Wells Fargo, after putting my fingerprint and my phone number 
9 and my name, everything on this check, she told me she had made 
10 the check. 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
So you pled guilty to theft by deception? 
Yeah. 
Theft oy deception means that you attempt to obtain 
14 property from another by deceiving them; isn't that right? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
deception? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yeah. But I didn't know until after. 
You attempted to get property from Wells Fargo by 
After -- after I found out, yes. 
And you entered that bank on February 4th, 2013? 
Yeah. 
Right? 
Yes. 
And the check number that you attempted to cash was 
24 102548, correct? 
25 A. I have no idea. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Q. And on February 4th, 2013, Christian Hale also 
entered the Wells Fargo Bank and attempted to a cash a check 
A. I don't know 
Q. -- check No. 102552; isn't that correct? 
MS. CHESNUT: Objection to 
THE WITNESS: Not with me. 
THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. He asked if she knew 
if that was correct, so I will allow her to respond. 
THE WITNESS: No, he -- not with me he didn't. I 
don't know. 
Q. Did you ever work for LG Warehousing in Salt Lake 
County? 
A. No. It's in Davis County. 
Q. But a check written on a payroll check from LG 
Warehousing had your name on it, correct? 
A. Yeah. It was made out to me like a regular check, 
like any check you would see. 
Q. And you thought that you could cash a payroll --
payroll check from LG Warehousing? 
A. Yeah. I thought it was her job, J.D. Cook's job, 
21 because she cleans houses and stuff. I didn't know what it was 
22 under. 
23 
24 
25 
Q. So it was everybody else lying not you lying? Is 
that what you are trying to say? 
A. No, I'm not saying I'm -- I'm not lying. I'm just 
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1 telling you the truth. Chris Hale was not in my court papers. 
2 He --- we did not go to court together. We never cashed a check 
3 together, ever; but met through the same person, we got the 
4 checks, but I didn't know that it was -- what was going on 
5 until after I had cashed that check at Wells Fargo, and they 
6 were going to charge me with a third-degree felony, and l pled 
7 guilty to a misdemeanor. 
8 MR. LOPRESTO: Your Honor, I would like to offer into 
9 evidence what has been marked as State's Exhibit No. 2. 
10 
11 
12 
13 ever. 
14 
THE COURT: Is that the docket? 
MR. LOPRESTO: That is the Infonnation, your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: He was never in the courtroom with me 
THE COURT: I think you are entitled to -- to 
15 introduce the conviction. I don't think you are entitled to 
16 introduce or to admit the Infor.mation. So I will allow you 
17 to introduce as an exhibit the conviction for theft by 
18 deception, but I'm not going to allow the Information. 
19 :MR. IDPRESTO: And I would argue, your Honor, the 
20 reason why it is being offered is because the witness has 
21 stated that Christian Hale was never on her court documents, 
22 and the State has --
23 
24 
THE WITNESS: He was not. 
MR. LOPRESTO: an Information with Christian 
25 Hale's name on it, with Ms. Larsen's name on it. The jury 
149 
. .J 
·..d 
1 should be entitled to see that documentation . 
2 THE WITNESS: My probation officer told me they made 
3 a mix-up. We have never been to court together. We have never 
4 been hooked together. We just got a check from the same 
5 person. 
6 THE COURT: What is your position, Ms. Chesnut? 
7 MS. CHESNUT: Um, well, obviously, an Information is 
8 allegations not a conviction. And, um, I'm not sure how 
9 this -- how allegations is impeachment material. 
10 THE COURT: Were you jointly charged with Mr. Hale? 
11 THE WITNESS: No . 
12 THE COURT: All right. I will allow the admission. 
13 * * * 
14 (State's Exhibit 2 was received into evidence.) 
15 * * * 
16 MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 MS. CHESNOT: And, your Honor, I will object, because 
18 it is not just going to whether they were charged together, 
19 which, by the way, I don't think is relevant here. 
20 THE COURT: It impeaches her testimony, Ms. Chesnut. 
21 MS. CHESNUT: Well, obviously, she is not an 
22 attorney. She doesn't know how court dockets work, how people 
2 3 are charged. 
24 THE COURT: I'm going to allow it. You can argue the 
25 weight. You may publish. 
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2 
MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: And just because I did that don't mean 
3 I'm not an honest person. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
THE COURT: There is no question for you, ma'am. 
Do you have any redirect? 
MS. CHESNUT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 * * * 
9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MS. CHESNUT: 
11 Q. Okay, Ms. Larsen, now, the Prosecution has talked to 
12 you about a conviction that you had earlier this year. 
13 
14 
A. 
Q. 
Uh-huh. 
And that was for a class A theft by deception; is 
15 that right? 
16 
17 
18 you? 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
you 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
about 
A. 
Q. 
24 involved 
25 A. 
Yes. 
So you were not convicted of the forgery count, were 
No. 
Okay. Now, urn, the Prosecution has also talked to 
a person Christian Hale. 
Yeah. 
Now -- and has talked to you about whether you were 
in this with him; is that right? 
Not with him but just involved in the circle -- there 
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1 was a circle of people, and they showed me pictures and asked 
2 me who I knew and who I didn't. It was a detective. 
3 Q. Okay. And, um, was that on this theft by deception 
4 count that you have been talking about? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. Now, um --
7 
8 
A. 
Q. 
But why they run me and him together, I don't know. 
Okay. Did, um -- did you know that he received a 
9 check as well? 
Yes. 
When did you find that out? 
Um, after I cashed mine. 
After you cashed yours? 
Uh-huh. 
But not before? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. Probably like a day later or so. Huh-uh. I hadn't 
seen him at all. 
Q. Okay. But you didn't know before? 
No. A. 
Q. Okay. This person you got the check from, how did 
21 you know her? 
22 A. I had known her for two years. I thought she was 
23 great. She was my one of my best friends. She helped me 
24 pack my house when I had some problems and needed to move. And 
25 she -- she was a great person. And she called me up to cash a 
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1 check for her, because she lost her ID, and I heard someone, a 
2 man in the background telling -- saying, um, well, we can just 
3 put it in her name, because it's you know, it's easier for 
4 her to cash that way. So they -- I said okay. They put it in 
5 my name. And I went and cashed it. I honestly did not know 
6 that was not a real check. I mean I put my real name, I put my 
7 real phone number, but I -- I was looking at a third-degree 
8 felony. I pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor before I could 
9 get a felony charge. 
10 
11 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. Okay. 
And just because this happened, it -- it ctoesn't mean 
12 I'm a liar, I'm not telling the truth today. 
13 Q. Does any of that circumstance with the check have 
14 anything to do with this case we are talking about today? 
15 
16 
A. 
Q. 
Nothing. 
Okay. Um, is anyone who was involved with that check 
17 involved in this case? 
18 
19 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
Um, was any of the -- did you receive any money from 
20 that check from that case --
21 
22 
23 
24 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
25 today? 
Yes, she did give me some money afterwards. 
Okay. And what happened to that? 
I spent it. 
Okay. Is any of that money involved in this case 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Okay. Um, okay, now, you say you have been friends 
3 with Debbie Clark, who is here today? 
4 A. Uh-huh. 
5 Q. Now, would you come into court and lie for her about 
6 something? 
7 A. No, I would not. 
8 Q. Why wouldn't you do that? 
9 A. Because it's not right. It '.s -- I'm -- I can admit 
10 to what I did, and I expect everyone else to be the same way. 
11 They should own their own, you know, problems or whatever. But 
12 I would never lie for her. 
13 Q. And is that why you pled to that check is because you 
14 did go cash it? 
15 A. Yeah, I did cash it. 
16 Q. So you took responsibility for that? 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. Okay. So, um, so are you saying you would expect 
19 Debbra Clark to do the same thing? 
20 A. Yeah, if she had done this, yes. 
21 Q. So, again, expecting that, would you come into court 
22 and lie for her? 
23 A. No. 
24 MS. CHESNUT: I have no further questions. 
25 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
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1 MR. IDPRESTO: No, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Any questions from the jury for 
3 Ms. Larsen? All right, write it down on a piece of paper and 
4 hand it to my bailiff, and I will review it with counsel. 
5 JUROR: It will take a second to write it down. 
6 THE COURT: Oh, you are fine. Take your time. While 
7 we are waiting for that to be done, um, there was an indication 
8 that the State was going to introduce a certified copy of the 
9 conviction for theft by deception. Um, is that the State's 
10 intention, or do you want to stipulate that that is a fact? 
11 It's up to you. 
12 MS. CHESNUT: The docket, you mean? 
13 THE COURT: Well, the judgment, commitment, whatever 
14 is in the court's file. 
15 MS. CHESNUT: Well, I think she has admitted it. 
16 THE COURT: So you are willing to -- to waive the 
17 actual judgment and conviction and will stipulate that she was 
18 convicted of a class A misdemeanor theft by deception? 
19 MS. CHESNUT: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: All right. So, members of the jury, we 
21 are not going to introduce a certified copy of the judgment 
22 wherein Ms. Larsen was convicted of theft by deception. The 
23 State -- or the Defense has indicated that they will stipulate 
24 that is a fact without taking the time to go down to the 
25 clerk's off.ice and have a certified copy of that conviction. 
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1 So you can take that as evidence in the case. Okay? 
2 
3 
4 
5 
All right, counsel, please approach. 
(A discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: Do you have a problem? 
MS. CHESNUT: I haven't seen this. I don't have a 
6 problem with that. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. LOPRESTO: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Proceedings held in open court.) 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Larsen, why would you 
11 knowingly cash a forged check for someone else? 
12 THE WITNESS: I didn't know it was forged until I 
13 cashed it. 
14 THE COURT: The second question, if someone else's 
15 payroll was not intended for you, why would -- why would you 
16 then spend the cash that you received from that check? 
17 THE WITNESS: Because she told me after I cashed the 
18 check that it was a check she had made, and I thought, ooh, 
19 money, you know, and I spent it. So that's why I pled guilty. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 'Any other questions from the 
21 jury? Any follow-up questions from counsel? 
22 MR. I.OPRESTO: No, your Honor. 
23 MS. CHESNUT: No, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank 
25 you, Ms. Larsen. 
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Utah R. Evid. 401 
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence 
Evidence is relevant if: 
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be withoµt 
the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1 (2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence ( 1971 }, but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a 
tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any ''material fact." A voiding the use of 
the tenn "material fact" accords with the application given to former Rule 1 (2) by the 
Utah Supreme Court. State v. Peterson, 560 P .2d 13 87 (Utah 1977). 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence 
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise~ 
• the United States Constitution; 
• the Utah Constitution; 
• a statute; or 
• rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evi9ence (1974) except that prior to 
the word "statute" the words "Constitution of the United States" have been added. 
:~ 
,_;,; 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or 
Other Reasons 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY CO:MMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Evidence ( 1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of 
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would 
be within the concept of 11unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory 
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances 
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. ·rex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case 
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same 
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiserv. Lobner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
Utah R. Evid. 611 
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence 
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasonable control over 
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: 
( 1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; 
(2) avoid wasting time; and 
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject 
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility. The court 
may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on direct examination 
except as necessary to develop the witness's testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow 
leading questions: 
(I) on cross-examination; and 
(2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an 
adverse party. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the inherent power of the court to 
control the judicial process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210, 461 P .2d 56 
( 1969). There was no comparable provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), but it is comparable to current Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-Rules 
Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6 Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is 
comparable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
·c; 
Utah R. Evid. 801 
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay 
(a) Statement. "Statement" means a person's oral assertion, written assertion, or 
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. "Declarant" means the person who made the statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that: 
(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 
( d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following 
conditions is not hearsay: 
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: 
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies having made 
the statement or has forgotten, or 
(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper 
influence or motive in so testifying; or 
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier. 
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party 
and: 
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; 
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; 
( C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the 
subject; 
(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope.of that 
relationship and while it existed; or 
(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subsection (a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices and machines, e.g., radar. The definition 
of "hearsay" in subdivision ( c) is substantially the same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (d)(l) is similar to Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates 
from the federal rule in that it allows use of prior statements as substantive evidence if ( 1) 
inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and does not require the prior statement to 
have been given under oath or subject to perjury. The former Utah rules admitted such 
statements as an exception to the hearsay rule. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 
( 1970), with respect to confrontation problems under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Subdivision (d)(l) is as originally promulgated by the United States 
Supreme Court with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and the actual effect 
on most juries. 
Subdivision (d)(l)(B) is in substance the same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 P.2d 388 (1957). 
Subdivision (d)(l)(C) comports with prior Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 
123,388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277,451 P.2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules 
of Evidence (1971 ), as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was of similar substance and scope to 
subdivision (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required that the declarant be unavailable 
c-·, 
;\:ilii/ 
before such admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious admissions have been 
recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161 (Utah 1980). 
Statements by a coconspirator of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay under subdivision ( d)(2)(E), have traditionally 
been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 
285 (1941). Rule 63(9)(b), l)tah Rules of Evidence (1971), was broader than this rule in 
that it provided for the admission of statements made while the party and declarant were 
participating in a plan to commit a crime or a civil wrong if the statement was relevant to 
the plan or its subject matter and made while the plan was in existence and before its 
complete execution or other termination. 
Utah R. Evid. 802 
Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974), and is the same as the 
first paragraph of Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
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U tab R. Evid. 803 
Rule 803. Exceptions to tbe Rule Against Hearsay - Regardless of Whether the 
Declarant Is Available as a Witness 
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
( 1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. 
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused. 
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the 
declarant' s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, 
sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed 
unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will. 
( 4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that: 
(A) is made for - and is reasonably pertinent to - medical diagnosis or treatment; and 
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; 
or their general cause. 
(5) Recorded Recollection. A record that: 
(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to 
testify fully and accurately; 
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's 
memory; and 
(C) accurately reflects the witness's knowledge. 
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only 
if offered by an adverse party. 
( 6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition, 
opinion, or diagnosis if: 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by - or from information transmitted by 
- someone with l01owledge; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, 
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified 
witness, or by a certification that complies with Ru]e 902( 11) or ( 12) or with a statute 
pennitting certification; and 
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
(7) Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is 
not included in a record described in paragraph ( 6) if: 
(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist; 
(B) a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and 
(C) neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a 
lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: 
(A) it sets out: 
(i) the office's activities; 
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal 
case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or 
(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a 
legally authorized investigation; and 
(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported 
to a public office in accordance with a legal duty. 
r:-: ~ 
( 10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony - or a certification under Rule 902 - that 
a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or 
certification is admitted to prove that: 
(A) the record or statement does not exist; or 
(B) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement 
for a matter of that kind. 
(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family History. A 
statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or 
marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept 
record of a religious organization. 
(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A statement of fact 
contained in a certificate: 
(A) made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform 
the act certified; 
(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered 
a sacrament; and 
(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time 
after it. 
(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a 
family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a 
portrait, or engraving on an urn or b~rial marker. 
( 14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record of a document 
that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if: 
(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along 
with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it; 
(B) the record is kept in a public office; and 
(C) a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office. 
( 15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained 
in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter 
stated was relevant to the document's purpose - unless later dealings with the property 
are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
( 16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that is at least 20 
years old and whose authenticity is established. 
( 17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market quotations, lists, 
directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons 
in particular occupations. 
( 18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in 
a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if: 
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or 
relied on by the expert on direct examination; and 
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or 
testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice. 
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit. 
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among a person's 
family by blood, adoption, or marriage - or among a person's associates or in the 
community- conceming the person's birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, 
divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal 
or family history. 
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in a community 
- arising before the controversy - concerning boundaries of land in the community or 
customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that 
community, state, or nation. 
(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person's associates or in 
the community concerning the person's character. 
(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if: 
(A) the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea; 
(B) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more 
than a year; 
(C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; and 
r, 
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(D) when offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than 
impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant. 
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History or a Boundary. A 
judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or 
boundaries, if the matter: 
(A) was essential to the judgment; and 
(B) could be proved by evidence of reputation. 
(24) [Other exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807 .] 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective December 1, 2000. 
U tab R. Evid. 804 
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay - When the Declarant is 
Unavailable as a Witness 
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a 
witness if the declarant: 
(I) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement 
because the com1 rules that a privilege applies; 
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; 
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; 
( 4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing 
infirmity, physical illness, or mental iJlness; or 
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, 
by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance. 
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or 
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the 
declarant from attending or testifying. 
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that: 
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given during 
the current proceeding or a different one; and 
(B) is now offered against a party who had - or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in 
interest had - an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or 
redirect examination. 
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a 
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant' s death to be imminent, if 
the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that: 
''"' 
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the person 
believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declaranes 
proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's 
claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and 
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that c1early indicate its trustworthiness, 
if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability. 
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about: 
(A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, 
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, even 
though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that fact; or 
(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the declarant was 
related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with 
the person's family that the declarant's infonnation is likely to be accurate. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 
62(7)[(e)], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule 804(a)(5). 
Subdivision (a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which permits judicial discretion 
to be applied in determining unavailability of a witness. 
Subdivision (b)(l) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
former rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of the testimony to a 
situation where the party to the action had the interest and opportunity to develop the 
testimony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1981 ). 
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
former rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the 
impending death nor did it limit dying declarations in criminal prosecutions to homicide 
cases. The rule has been modified by making it applicable to any civil or criminal 
proceeding, subject to the qualification that the judge finds the statement to have been 
made in good faith. 
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though 
it does not extend merely to social interests. 
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (b)(5) had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Utah R. Evid. 807 
Rule 807. Residual Exception 
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not 
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a 
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: 
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; 
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that 
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 
( 4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. 
(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the 
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and 
its particulars, including the declarant' s name and address, so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to meet it. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 
807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. No substantive 
change is intended. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
Utah R. Evid. 901 
Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence 
(a) In General. To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
item is what the proponent claims it is. 
(b) Examples. The following are examples only- not a complete list - of evidence 
that satisfies the requirement: 
(1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is 
claimed to be. 
(2) Nonexpert Opinion About Handwriting. A nonexpert's opinion that handwriting is 
genuine, based on a familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation. 
(3) Comparison by an Expe1i Witness or the Trier of Fact. A comparison with an 
authenticated specimen by an expert witness or the trier of fact. 
( 4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all 
the circumstances. 
(5) Opinion About a Voice. An opinion identifying a person's voice-whether heard 
firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording - based on 
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with the alleged 
speaker. 
(6) Evidence About a Telephone Conversation. For a telephone conversation, evidence 
that a call was made to the number assigned at the time to: 
(A) a particular person, if circumstances, including self-identification, show that the 
person answering was the one called; or 
(B) a particular business, if the call was made to a business and the call related to 
business reasonably transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Evidence About Public Records. Evidence that: 
(A) a document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law; or 
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(B) a purported public record or statement is from the office where items of this kind are 
kept. 
(8) Evidence About Ancient Documents or Data Compilations. For a document or data 
compilation, evidence that it: 
(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity; 
(B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be; and 
(C) is at least 20 years old when offered. 
(9) Evidence About a Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system and 
showing that it produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods Provided by a Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or 
identification allowed by court rule or statute of this state. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
st-yle and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
st-ylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (b)(2) is in accord with State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447 (1906). 
Subdivision (b)(8) is comparable with Rule 67, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), except 
that the former rule imposed a 30-year requirement. Subdivision (b )( 10) is an adaptation 
of subdivision (10) in the comparable federal rules to conform to state practice. 
Utah R. Evid. 902 
Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating 
The following items of evidence are se]f-authenticating; they require no extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted: 
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed. A document that bears: 
(A) a seal purp011ing to be that of the United States; any state, district, commonwealth, 
territory, or insular possession of the United States; the former Panama Canal Zone; the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; a political subdivision of any of these entities; or a 
department, agency, or officer of any entity named above; and 
(B) a signature purporting to be an execution or attestation. 
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed But Are Signed and Certified. A 
document that bears no seal if: 
(A) it bears the signature of an officer or employee of an entity named in Rule 
902( 1 )(A); and 
(B) another public officer who has a seal and official duties within that same entity 
certifies under seal - or its equivalent - that the signer has the official capacity and that 
the signature is genuine. 
(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document that purports to be signed or attested by a 
person who is authorized by a foreign country's law to do so. The document must be 
accompanied by a final certification that certifies the genuineness of the signature and 
official position of the signer or attester - or of any foreign official whose certificate of 
genuineness relates to the signature or attestation or is in a chain of certificates of 
genuineness relating to the signature or attestation. The certification may be made by a 
secretary of a United States embassy or legation; by a consul general, vice consul, or 
consular agent of the United States; or by a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign 
country assigned or accredited to the United States. If all parties have been given a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the document's authenticity and accuracy, the court 
may, for good cause, either: 
(A) order that it be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification; or 
(B) allow it to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification. 
[\ 
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( 4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record - or a copy of a 
document that was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized by law - if the copy 
is certified as correct by: 
(A) the custodian or another person authorized to make the certification; or 
(B) a certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), or any law of the United 
States or of this state. 
(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlet, or other publication purporting to be issued 
by public authority. 
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed material purporting to be a newspaper or 
periodical. 
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. An inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have 
been affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control. 
(8) Acknowledged Documents. A document accompanied by a certificate of 
acknowledgment that is lawfully executed by a notary public or another officer who is 
authorized to take acknowledgments. 
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial paper, a signature on it, and 
related documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law. 
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute. A signature, document, or anything else that a 
federal statute declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic. 
( 11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a 
copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown 
by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a 
manner that, if falsely made, would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws 
where the certification was signed. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an 
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record - and must make 
the record and certification available for inspection - so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to challenge them. 
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. The original or a copy 
of a foreign record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a 
certification of the custodian or another qualified person that must be signed in a manner 
that, if falsely made, would subject the signer to criminal penalty under the laws where 
the certification was signed. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an 
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record - and must make 
the record and certification available for inspection-so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to challenge them. 
2011 Advisory Committee Note. -The language of this rule has been amended as part of 
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make 
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be 
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence 
admissibilit-y. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The amendment to Rule 803(6) and the addition of Rules 902(11) and 902(12) were made 
to track the changes made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) and the adoption of 
Federal Rules 902(11) and 902(12), effective December 1, 2000. The changes to the 
federal rules benefit from a federal statute allowing the use of declarations without 
notarization. Utah has no comparable statute, so the requirements for declarations used 
under the rule are included within the rule itself. 
:~ 
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U.S. Const. amend VI 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
infonned of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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SIM GiLL, Bar No. 6389 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County FILED 0/S"rn 
JAMES COPE, Bar No. 0726 n,ll'd JuJ/;,ICT COURT 
Deputy District Attorney af 0/sfrlct 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE #400 MAY 1 0 20l3 SALT LAI<E CITY, UT 84111 "'"· SAL;LAKs 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 -,~ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBBIE ClllLD LARSEN 
DOB:-
AKA: J)ehhi Child, J)ebbie Cox Child, 
Debbie Cox, Debbi Larsen 
D.L.#-
OTN 
SO# 
CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
DOB:-
Defendant(s . 
Screened by: JAMES COPE 
Assigned to: STEVEN GREEN 
INFORMATION 
DAO# 13009014 
ECR Status: ECR 
Initial Appearance: 
Bail: $5,000 
Warrant/Release: NOT BOOKED 
Case No. 
Co-Deft DAO #13009015 
The undersigned Pat Mount - Salt Lake City Police Department, Agency Case No. 13-
27 621, upon a written declaration states on information and belief that the defendant, DEBBIE 
CHILD LARSEN, committed the crime(s) of: 
COUNTl 
FORGERY, 76-6-501(2) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about February 04, 
2013 at 1710 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did , with 
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he was facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated 
by anyone, 
(a) alter any writing of another without his authority or uttered the altered writing; or 
(b) make, complete, execute, authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the · 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication 
or utterance: 
ST ATE vs DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
DAO# 13009014 
Page 2 
(i) purported to be the act of another, whether the person was existent or nonexistent; 
(ii) purported to be an act on behalf of another party without the authority of that other party; or 
(iii) purported to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was 
in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. 
COUNT2 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, 76-6-405 UCA, Class A Misdemeanor, as follows: That on or about 
February 04, 2013 at 1710 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake Cowity, State of Utah, the 
defendant did obtain or exercise control over the property of another by deception, with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or exceeded $500, but 
was less than $1,500. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Pat Mount, Troy Hyde, David Timmerman. 
DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your declarant bases the Information upon the following: 
The statement of Troy Hyde, owner of LG Warehousing located in Salt Lake County that 
while reviewing hls company finances he noticed four checks that appeared to be payroll checks 
were cashed at different Wells Fargo Bank branches. Mr. Hyde stated that his company payroll 
is managed through a different company and not Wells Fargo. Mr. Hyde stated that one of the 
checks had a telephone number on it for one suspect, Defendant DEBBIE LARSEN. Mr. Hyde 
made contact with the defendant who admitted that she cashed a check and asked Hyde if she 
could pay him back. 
On February 4, 2013, Defendant DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN entered the Wells Fargo 
Bank branch located at 1710 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, and presented check 
number - to be cashed. The check was made payable to the defendant, drawn on Wells 
Fargo Bank accoun_, and issued to LG Warehousing for the amount of $971.48. 
On February 4, 2013, I)efendant CHRJSTIAN PAUL HALE entered the Wells Fargo 
Bank branch located at 1095 East 2100 South, Salt Lake County, and presented check number 
- to be cashed. The check was made payable to the defendant, drawn on Wells Fargo 
Bank account_, and issued to LG Warehousing for the amount of$987.05. 
• 
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The statement of Salt Lake City Police Officer P. Mount that he compared both 
defendants booking photos with the Wells Fargo Bank video surveillance photos and detennined 
that they are the same individuals. Officer Mount showed a video surveillance photo of 
Defendant HALE to Defendant LARSEN and she positively identified CHRIS as the person in 
the surveillance photo, 
Post .. Miranda, Defendant LARSEN admitted to Officer Mowit she got the check from her 
long .. time friend, JD Cook, and that Cook bought a sheet of LG Warehousing checks from 
"Berta" and is using the sheet of checks to reproduce the checks and cash all over the Salt Lake 
Valley. 
The Court is notified that Defendant HALE is subject to enhanced penalties in that he has 
been twice before convicted of Theft in the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, under 
#131902001, and in the Third District Court, West Jordan Department, under #131400403. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
SIM GILL, District Attorney 
. uty District Attorney 
9. day of May, 2013 
M/SRB/DAO #13009014 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B~5--705 
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
~wt 
Declarant 
SO# OTN 
DAO# 13009014 
IN THE THlRP DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN A.ND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
DOB:-
AKA: Debbi Child, Debbie Cox Child, 
Debbie Cox, Debbi Larsen 
SS#-
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH; 
Before:. ____________ _ 
Magistrate 
WARRANT OF ARREST 
Case No. 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah, Greetings: 
An Infonnation, based upon a written declaration having been declared by Pat Mount -
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Agency Case No. 13-27621, and it appears from 
the Information or Declaration filed with the lnfonnation, that there is probable cause to believe 
that the public offense(s) of; 
FORGERY, Third Degree Felony, THEFT BY DECEPTION, Class A Misdemeanor, has been 
committed, and that DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN has committed them. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to an-est the above~named defendant 
forthwith and bring the defendant before this Court, or before the nearest or most accessible 
magistrate for setting bail. If the defendant has fled justice, you shall pursue the defendant into 
any other county of this state and there arrest the defendant. The Court finds reasonable grounds 
to believe defendant will not appear upon a summons. 
Bail is set in the amount of $5,000. 
Dated this /'0 day of May A.D. 20_1:3'·= --~:-,,._.,_ 
- - Z~"-~~Y t-: ' .. 
This W :a.~:~'ii5t b'¢:s_erved day or night. 
Ct) ,'A-•;.•,·.- ,· . ' 
t {~ f ::·:·: ·: . 
!. · , _} , .. ,· , '.;;;:••t.,_· -
·.- . ... ; 
SERVED DATE: ________ BY _____________ _ 
·• 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Defendants CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE, DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN, are 
linked. 
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013 
Disposition: June 21, 2013 Transferred 
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 -_THEFT BY DECEPTIO~ Class A Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013· 
Disposition: June 21, 2013 Transferred 
·CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDGE ECR 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Also Known As - DEBBI CHILD (LARSEN, DEBBIE CHILD) 
Also Known As - DEBBIE COX CHILD (LARSEN, DEBBIE CHILD) 
@ DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
Date of Birth: March 08, 1967 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 13-27621 
Prosecuting Agenc'y: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 13009014 
Sheriff Office Number: 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
CASE NOTE 
DAO 13009014 / ECR / West Jordan/LDA APPOINTED 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-10-13 Case filed 
Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20 Page 1 of 4 
CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony 
05-10-13 Filed: From an Information 
05-10-13 Filed: Information 
05-10-13 Note: Case filed by Pat Mount - SLC Police Dept. Deft not 
booked -- warrant issued. 
05-10-13 Warrant ordered on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306629 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
05-10-13 Warrant issued on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306629 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
Judge: SU CHON 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
06-03-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/DEFT. SET scheduled on June 10, 2013 at 
08:30 AM in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH. 
06-03-13 Judge JAMES BLANCH assigned. 
06-03-13 Note: Deft. called to set court date 
06-10-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE 
Judge: SU CHON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cyndiav 
Prosecutor: TAN, PATRICK s 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MCDOUGALL IV, ISAAC E 
Audio 
Tape Number: CR 831 Tape Count: 11:43-44 
HEARING 
This matter is before the court for an Initial Appearance, which 
the defendant scheduled. The defendant is not present. The court 
orders the outstanding warrant be recalled and reissued in the 
amount of $10,000. 
06-10-13 Warrant recalled on: June 10, 2013 Warrant num: 985306629 
Recall reason: Based upon Court Order. 
06-10-13 Notice - WARRANT for Case 131904477 ID 15278002 
06-10-13 Warrant ordered on: June 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985309395 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000,00 
Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20 Paqe 2 of 4 
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CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony 
06-10-13 Warrant issued on: June 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985309395 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
Judge: SU CHON 
Issue reason: Failure to appear for mandatory court 
appearance 
06-14-13 INITIAL APP/WARRANT/DEFT SET scheduled on June 19, 2013 at 
08:30 AM in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH. 
06-14-13 Note: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN called to schedule a court date. 
Advised defendant the warrant remains outstanding until 
she appears. 
06-19-13 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment of Legal Defender 
(Appointed) 
06-19-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: JAMES BLANCH 
PRESENT 
Clerk: anthonyh 
Prosecutor: APLIN, AARON M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney{s): MCDOUGALL IV, ISAAC E 
Audio 
Tape Number: S31 Tape Count: 9:34 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
HEARING 
Defendant has decided to opt out of ECR. State withdraws the 
offer. Court orders the bail reduced to $5000. The Defendant is to 
be booked and Pretrial is to evaluate the Defendant for 
supervision. Judge Christiansen is assigned. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal 
Printed: 05/15/15 16:16:20 l?aqe 3 of 4 
CASE NUMBER 131904477 State Felony 
Defenders to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Address: 424 East 500 South Suite #300 
City: Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Phone: 801-532-5444 
Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant 
06-19-13 Note: Bail Amount Changed from $10000.00 to $5000.00 
06-19-13 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is SU CHON 
06-21-13 Warrant recalled on: June 21, 2013 Warrant num: 985309395 
Recall reason: Based upon Court Order. 
06-21-13 Note: Case Transferred to West Jordan District Case# 131400723 
07-19-13 Judge JUDGE ECR assigned. 
Printed: OS/15/15 16:16:20 Paqe 4 of 4 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
~ CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony (amended) to 
3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013 
Plea: September 24, 2013 Not Guilty 
Disposition: December OS, 2013 Dismissed (w/o prej) 
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 - THEFT BY DECEPTION Class A Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013 
Plea: December 05, 2013 Guilty 
Disposition: December 05, 2013 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARTIES 
L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
Defendant - DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
Represented by: PETER D GOODALL 
Also Known As - DEBBI CHILD 
Also Known As - DEBBIE COX CHILD 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Bondsman - B & B BAIL BONDS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
Offense tracking number: 43075761 
Date of Birth: March 08, 1967 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 13-27621 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 13009014 
Sheriff Office Number: 367B51 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 5,000.00 
Printed~ 05/18/15 15:03:52 Page 1 of 13 
CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Exonerated: 5,000.00 
Balance: 0.00 
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 1,000.00 
Amount Paid: 1,000.00 
Credit: o.oo 
Trust Balance Due: 0.00 
Balance Payable: 0.00 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 
Posted By: B & B BAIL BONDS {#K340) 
Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
TRUST DETAIL 
5,000.00 
0.00 
5,000.00 
0.00 
Trust Description: Other Trust 
Recipient: DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN 
Amount Due: 28. 52 
Paid In: 
Paid Out: 
TRUST DETAIL 
2B.52 
28.52 
Trust Description: Restitution 
Recipient: WELLS FARGO BANK NA 
Amount Due: 
Paid In: 
Paid Out: 
Account Adjustments 
Date 
Apr 04, 2014 
Amount 
971. 48 
-1,871.48 
971. 48 
971. 48 
971. 48 
Reason 
Court Ordered 
Court Ordered Apr 04, 2014 
Apr 17, 2014 -28.52 Adjustment down due to Account 
Transfer. 
CASE NOTE 
Prob 18 months SLCP begin 2/11/14 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-10-13 Case filed by carola 
05-10-13 Filed: Information 
05-10-13 Warrant Ordered 
Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
Paqe 2 of 13 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
05-10-13 Warrant Issued 
06-03-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/DEFT. SET 06/10/2013 
06-10-13 Minutes for INITIAL APPEARANCE 
06-10-13 Warrant Recalled 
96-10-13 WARRANT for Case 131904477 ID 15278002 
06-10-13 Warrant Ordered 
06-10-13 Warrant Issued 
06-14-13 INITIAL APP/WARRANT/DEFT SET 06/19/2013 
06-19-13 Filed: Affidavit Requesting Appointment 
06-19-13 Minutes for Initial Appearance 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRA..'I\JSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
TRANSFERRED 
06-21-13 Warrant Recalled TRANSFERRED 
06-21-13 Case filed 
06-21-13 Filed: From an Information 
06-21-13 Note: Case transferred from Salt Lake City District. Case 
131904477 
06-21-13 Judge BRUCE LUBECK assigned. 
06-21-13 Notice - WARRANT for Case 131400723 ID 15303158 
06-21-13 Warrant ordered on: June 21, 2013 Warrant Num: 985310699 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
06-21-13 Warrant issued on: June 21, 2013 Warrant Num: 985310699 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Issue reason: Based on Court Order 
06-21-13 Judge TERRY CHRISTIANSEN assigned. 
06-21-13 SCHEDULING 1 scheduled on July 09, 2013 at 08:45 AM in WJ 
Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
~ 06-21-13 SCHEDULING 1 scheduled on July 09, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
;ii) 
Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
06-27-13 Filed: Appearance of Counsel 
06-27-13 Filed: Request for Discovery 
06-27-13 Filed: Other Demand that the State Produce the Preparers of all 
Reports and Chain of Custody Witnesses at Trial 
06-27-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-02-13 Filed: Substitution of Counsel 
07-02-13 Filed: Request for Discovery 
07-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-02-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52 Paqe 3 of 13 
CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
07-05-13 Warrant recalled on: July OS, 2013 Warrant num: 985310699 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked, 
07-09-13 2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on July 23, 2013 at 08:30 AM 
in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
07-09-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 1 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: caseyh 
Prosecutor: BOEHM, MICHAEL P 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MASSE, MICHAEL J 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 9:40-41 
HEARING 
The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional 
review of the case. The court so orders. 
2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/23/2013 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 37 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
07-09-13 Filed: B & B BAIL BONDS 5000.00 
07-09-13 Bond Account created Total Due: 5000,00 
07-09-13 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 5,000.00 
07-17-13 Filed: Motion to withdraw as court appointed counsel by 
Michael Masse 
07-17-13 Note: Paperwork sent to Judge for signature 
07-23-13 3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on August 05, 2013 at 01:30 
PM in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
07-23-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 2 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
PRESENT 
Printed: 05/18/15 15:03:52 Paqe 4 of 13 
CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Clerk: caseyh 
Prosecutor: LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 8:56-57 
HEARING 
The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional 
review of the case. The court so orders. 
3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/05/2013 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 37 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
07-23-13 Filed order: Order of withdraw as court appointed counsel 
Judge TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Signed July 22, 2013 
i..ii, 07-30-13 Filed: First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
08-05-13 4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on August 19, 2013 at 08:30 
AM in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
08-05-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 3 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
~ PRESENT 
Clerk: caseyh 
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 2:14-15 
HEARING 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
The parties stipulate to continue this matter for additional 
review of the case. The court so orders. 
4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/19/2013 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 37 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
08-09-13 Filed: First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
08-19-13 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on September 17, 2013 at 01:30 PM 
in WJ Courtroom 37 with Judge CHRISTIANSEN. 
08-19-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for 4 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: caseyh 
Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 8:45-46 
HEARING 
Counsel requests this matter be set for a preliminary hearing. 
The state does not object. The court so orders. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/17/2013 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 37 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
09-17-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
PRESENT 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Clerk: caseyh 
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 37 Tape Count: 1:55-56 
HEARING 
Counsel advises that the defendant would like to waive their 
right to a preliminary hearing. The state consents to the waiver. 
The court reviews the rights the defendant would be giving up and 
accepts the waiver. Matter is bound over. 
PTC/BO/ARR is scheduled. 
Date: 09/24/2013 
Time: 08 :30 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS 
09-17-13 PTC/BO/ARR scheduled on September 24, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
~ Courtroom 31 with Judge KOORIS. 
09-17-13 Judge MARK KOURIS assigned. 
09-24-13 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty 
09-24-13 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty 
09-24-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL 
~ Judge: MARK KOURIS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: salomet 
Prosecutor: GREEN, STEVEN J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 8:50 
HEARING 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Defendant waive time. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 10/22/2013 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS 
09-24-13 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 22, 2013 at 01:30 PM 
in WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS. 
10-23-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL CONFERENCE continue 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: salomet 
Prosecutor: P..A..~SEN, MATTHEW J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Video 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 2:17 
CONTINUANCE 
Whose Motion: 
The Defendant's counsel PETER D GOODALL. 
Reason for continuance: 
Request of counsel 
The motion is granted. 
FINAL DISPO is scheduled. 
Date: 12/05/2013 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS 
10-23-13 FINAL DISPO continued to December 05, 2013 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS. 
12-05-13 Filed: PSR requested from SLCP 
12-05-13 Charge 76-6-501(2) Sev F3 was amended to 76-6-501(2) Sev F3 
12-05-13 Charge 76-6-405 Sev MA was amended to 76-6-405 Sev MA 
12-05-13 
12-05-13 
12-05-13 
Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed 
Charge 2 Disposition is Guilty 
Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: salomet 
Prosecutor: HANSEN, MATTHEW J 
Defendant 
Plea 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 9:47 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders S.L. County Probation Services to prepare a 
Pre-sentence report. 
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an 
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense. 
SENT/SLCPS is scheduled. 
Date: 01/28/2014 
Time: o 8: 3 o a. m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS 
~ 12-05-13 SENT/SLCPS scheduled on January 28, 2014 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS. 
12-05-13 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony 
12-06-13 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in advance of Guilty Plea. 
Judge MARK KOURIS 
Signed December 05, 2013 
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01-21-14 ****PROTECTED**** Filed: Pre Sentence Investigation Report 
01-28-14 SENT/SLCPS 2 continued to February 11, 2014 at 08:30 AM in WJ 
Courtroom 31 with Judge KOURIS. 
01-28-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING continued 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: melisses 
Prosecutor: WAYMENT, DAVID HT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D 
Audio 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 8.41 
CONTINUANCE 
Whose Motion: 
The Defendant. 
Reason for continuance: 
Defendant 1 s request 
The motion is granted. 
SENT/SLCPS 2 is scheduled. 
Date: 02/11/2014 
Time: 08 :30 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 S REDWOOD ROAD 
SUITE 1701 
WEST JORDAN, UT 84088 
Before Judge: MARK KOURIS 
02-11-14 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: MARK KOURIS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: salomet 
Prosecutor: WAYMENT, DAVID HT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s}: GOODALL, PETER D 
Sheriff Office#: 367851 
Audio 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Tape Number: 31 Tape Count: 9:31 
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE 
DEBBI CHILD 
DEBBIE COX CHILD 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 50 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service to be completed through S.L. County Probation 
Services. 
SENTENCE COMMUNITY SERVICE NOTE 
Complete 50 hours of community service at the rate of 5 hours per 
month. The first 5 hours due in May 1, 2014. Thereafter, due on the 
first of each month. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by S.L. County Probation Services. 
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Report to Salt Lake County Probation within 24 hours. 
Enter into and complete any treatment recommended by Salt Lake 
County Probation. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Not to possess or consume alcohol or non prescribed contol 
substances. 
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are sold. 
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CASE NUMBER 131400723 State Felony 
Complete a substance abuse evaluation and comply with all 
recommended treatment. 
Defendant probation with Salt Lake Probation Service for a period 
of 18 months. 
Successfully complete a dual focus substance abuse and follow 
through with any treatment recommended. 
All of the drugs and alcohol condition will be in place. 
Any prescribed medication notify SLCP Agnet, 
No alcohol entire time on probation. 
Submit to random urine analysis testing. 
Pay a restitution of $1,900 in the amount of $50 per month. The 
first $50 due in May 1, 2014. Thereafter, due on the first of each 
month. 
Restitution will remain open for 90 days. 
All of the standard and ordinary conditions from AP&P will apply. 
02-11-14 Filed: SLC Probation Referral 
02-12-14 Bond Exonerated 
02-12-14 Trust Account created 
02-12-14 Filed: Letters Re: Defendant 
Total Due: 
02-12-14 Note: Added to payment schedule 1060089334 
02-12-14 Filed: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment. 
02-14-14 Filed: Motion for Restitution 
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH, 
-5,000.00 
1900.00 
02-14-14 ****PROTECTED**** Filed: Protected Victim Information 
02-21-14 Restitution Payment Received: 1,000.00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
03-25-14 Note: emailed Barbara@ DA's office regarding Order on 
Restitution. 
03-27-14 Filed: State's Request to Submit for Decision 
03-27-14 Note: E-filing to Judge 
04-04-14 Filed order: Order for Restitution 
Judge MARK KOORIS 
Signed April 04, 2014 
04-04-14 Restitution adjusted to $2871.48 Total 
Reason: Court Ordered 
04-04-14 Restitution adjusted to $1000.00 Total 
Reason: Court Ordered 
Due: 
Due: 
04-08-14 Restitution Check# 45245 Trust Payout: 971.48 
971.48 
971.48 
04-08-14 Note: Defendant paid $1,000.00 prior to sentencing, Order of 
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Restitution to the victim is $971.48. A balance of 
$28.52 is remaining. 
04-08-14 Filed: Money in Trust - $28.52 balance remaining after paying 
restitution - give to J-Kouris for Decision. 
~ 04-10-14 Note: Trust Check Mailed Out 
04-17-14 Filed order: Money in Trust - Court orders $28.52 in 
restitution be released to the Defendant. 
Judge MARK KOURIS 
Signed April 15, 2014 
..i) 04-17-14 Trust Account created Total Due: 28.52 
04-17-14 Restitution -28.52 
Note: Judicial Order - Account Transfer; Over payment of 
restitution to be refunded to defendant 
04-17-14 Other Trust Transfer In: 28.52 
04-21-14 Other Trust Check# 45299 Trust Payout: 28.52 
04-22-14 Note: Other trust check mailed 
04-30-14 Note: *Trust check(45299) sent to Debbie Larsen is returned to 
the Court. No new address has been provided by the USPS. 
05-06-14 Note: Called Mr. Goodall, ATD - He requested that the check be 
mailed to him and he will get it to his client. Check 
#45299 for $28.52 remailed this date. 
06-12-14 ****PRIVATE**** Filed: Substance abuse and Mental Health 
02-13-15 Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN assigned. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
CASE NUMBER 131904476 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Defendants CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE, DEBBIE CHILD LARSEN, are 
linked. 
Charge 1 - 76-6-501(2) - FORGERY 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013 
Plea: June 06, 2013 Guilty 
Disposition: June 06, 2013 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-6-405 - THEFT BY DECEPTION 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: February 04, 2013 
Disposition: June 06, 2013 Dismissed (w/o prej} 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDGE ECR 
PARTIES 
Defendant - CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
Represented by: KIMBERLY A CLARK 
Plaintiff - . STATE OF UTAH 
~ DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
Offense tracking number: 43043553 
Date of Birth: January 31, 1967 
Jail Booking Number: 13026841 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 13-27621 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 13009015 
Sheriff Office Number: 155467 
ACCOUNT SUMl\fARY 
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Trust Balance Due: 
Printe~: 05/15/15 16:16:52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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Balance Payable: 0. 00 . 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description: Interest on Rstitutn 
Recipient: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT. 
Amount Due: 0.00 
Paid In: 0.00 
Pai.d Out: 
Account Adjustments 
Date Amount 
Jun 07, 2013 
Jun 07, 2013 
State Debt Collection 
TRUST DETAIL 
0.06 
-0.06 
0.00 
Reason 
Interest Posted to Date 
Adjusted to zero and set to 
Trust Description: Restitution 
Recipient: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT. 
Amount Due: 0.00 
Paid In: 0,00 
Paid Out: 0.00 
Account Adjustments 
Date Amount Reason 
Jun 07, 2013 -987.05 Adjusted to zero and set to 
State Debt Collection 
CASE NOTE 
DAO 13009015 / ECR / West Jordan/LDA APPOINTED 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-10-13 Case filed 
05-10-13 Filed: From an Information 
05-10-13 Filed: Information 
05-10-13 Note: Case filed by Pat Mount - SLC Police Dept. Deft not 
booked -- warrant issued. 
05-10-13 Warrant ordered on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306628 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000.00 
05-10-13· Warrant issued on: May 10, 2013 Warrant Num: 985306628 Bail 
Allowed 
Bail amount: 5000,00 
Judge: SU CHON 
Issue reason: Based on the probable cause statement. 
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05-31-13 INITIAL APPEARANCE/JAIL scheduled on June 04, 2013 at 01:30 PM 
in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH. 
05-31-13 Warrant recalled on: May 31, 2013 Warrant num: 985306628 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
05-31-13 Judge JAMES BLANCH assigned. 
06-03-13 Filed order: Declaration - LOA Appointed 
Judge SU CHON 
Signed June 03, 2013 
~ 06-04-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Appointment of Counsel 
Judge: JAMES BLANCH 
PRESENT 
Clerk: katiem 
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D 
Defendant 
Defendant's At~orney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A 
Sheriff Office#: 155467 
Audio 
Tape Number: S31 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
Tape Count: 3:20 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
HEARING 
TIME: 3:20 PM Defendant present from ADC. Defense requests to 
continue the matter for two days and gives basis. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
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Address: 424 East 500 South Suite #101 
City: Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Phone: 532-5444 
Affidavit of indigency has been c~mpleted by the defendant 
ECR STATUS CONF #1/JAIL is scheduled. 
Date: 06/06/2013 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Arraignment - S31 
Third District Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: JAMES BLANCH 
06-04-13 ECR STATUS CONF #1/JAIL scheduled on June 06, 2013 at 01:30 PM 
in ECR - S31 with Judge BLANCH. 
06-06-13 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
06-06-13 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed 
06-06-13 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: JAMES BLANCH 
PRESENT 
Clerk: katiem 
Prosecutor: APLIN, AARON M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CLARK, KIMBERLY A 
Sheriff Office#: 155467 
Audio 
Tape Number: S31 Tape Count: 3:30 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
Defendant waives the reading of the Information. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
HEARING 
TIME~ 
charged with count two to be dismissed. 
Court regarding the recommendations. 
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Defendant waives the right to preliminary hearing and the Court 
binds the matter over to the District Court. 
Court orders the defendant to serve 270 day jai.1 with credit 
granted for 8 days time served and to run concurrent with any other 
sentence serving. Court orders case to be closed. Court orders 
restitution be sent to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 270 day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 8 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Court orders the defendant to serve 270 day jail with credit 
granted for 8 days time served and to run concurrent with any other 
sentence serving. 
Restitution Amount: $987.05 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT. 
06-06-13 Trust Account created Total Due: 987.05 
06-06-13 Filed order: Signed Minutes - Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Judge JAMES BLANCH 
Signed June 06, 2013 
06-06-13 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel 
Judge JAMES BLANCH 
Signed June 06, 2013 
06-07-13 Trust Account created Total Due: 
06-07-13 Note: Case sent to State Debt. Collection 
06-07-13 Judgment #1 Entered$ 987.11 
Creditor: STATE DEBT COLLECTION 
0.00 
Creditor: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD DEPT. 
Debtor: CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
987.05 Restitution 
Creditor: STATE DEBT COLLECTION 
Creditor: 119-9957613459-DDA WELLS FARGO FRAUD 
Debtor: CHRISTIAN PAUL HALE 
0.06 Interest on Rstitutn 
987.11 Judgment Grand Total 
06-24-13 Filed: Appearance of Counsel 
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06-24-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-19-13 Judge JUDGE ECR assigned. 
11-20-13 Filed: Motion FOR CATS REVIEW 
Filed by: HALE, CHRISTIAN PAUL 
11-20-13 Filed: Order (Proposed) FOR CATS REVIEW 
11-20-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
11-21-13 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) FOR CATS 
REVIEW 
11-21-13 Note: CATS review denied. Sentence does not mention CATS or 
early release, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to modify 
it. 
11-21-13 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
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